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1. Politicians Choosing Their Voters
REDMAP and American Democracy
Part I: The Gerry-mander, REDMAP, and How to Win an Election Without Really Trying
Gerrymandering is the process of redrawing a Congressional or state legislative map in order to
advantage a political party or protect an incumbent politician from being removed from power.
The Constitution mandates that there be a reallocation of seats in the House of Representatives
every ten years, which coincides with the Census (Article 1, Section 2). The Census records the
population statistics for each state, and as state populations change, so too must the number of
seats each state receives in the House of Representatives. In the upcoming 2020 reallocation, for
example, states like New York, Alabama, and Pennsylvania are projected to lose 1 or more seats,
while states such as Texas, Florida, and Colorado are projected to gain seats.1
In addition to affecting the balance of power between states, the reallocation demands that all
states redistrict with now-updated Census data; as districts within a state must have (roughly)
equal populations, as stipulated by a series of Supreme Court cases in the 1960s, the new2
Census data forces all states to redraw their lines, even if the total number of districts in a state
stays the same. Thus, every decade new maps must be produced across the nation, providing an
opportunity for partisan interests to determine the political trajectory for (at least) the next
decade, until another round of reapportionment forces the production of new maps.
In 31 states, the state legislature draws the Congressional district lines; additionally (and
ironically), in 30 states, the state legislature draws their own district lines. Thus, in the majority3
of states, the redistricting process is controlled by partisan interests, and this truth is reflected in
the Congressional delegations from states in which the districts are controlled by state
legislatures. Comparing a study from the Brennan Center for Justice by Laura Royden and4
4 Daniel McGlone, “Here’s a Map of Every State Legislator in 2019,” Azavea, February 12, 2019.
https://www.azavea.com/blog/2019/02/12/2019-legislator-map/; “Post Election 2019 State & Legislative Partisan
Composition,” National Conference of State Legislatures, November 22, 2019, https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1
/Documents/Elections/Legis_Control_2019_Post-Election%20Nov%2022nd.pdf.
3 “Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and Congressional Redistricting,” Brennan Center for Justice, January 30,
2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/who-draws-maps-legislative-and-
congressional-redistricting.
2 Micah Altman and Michael McDonald, “Equal Population,” Public Mapping Project, accessed December 3, 2020,
http://www.publicmapping.org/what-is-redistricting/redistricting-criteria-equal-population. (See Wesberry v Sanders
and Reynolds v Sims)
1 Brianna Cea, “Potential Shifts in Political Power After the 2020 Census,” Brennan Center for Justice, March 27,
2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/potential-shifts-political-power-after-2020-census.
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Michael Li entitled Extreme Maps to my own data, in states where the Congressional
redistricting process was completely controlled by Republicans in 2011, in the last election, in
2018, there were 28 more Republican Representatives than would be proportional to their share
of the vote. In states where redistricting was under sole Democratic control in 2011, in 20185
Democrats netted 5 extra seats relative to their share of the vote. One reason for this is that in
2011, the most recent redistricting year, Republicans had sole control over the redistricting
process in 16 states while Democrats enjoyed that power in only 6 states.
Partisan Gerrymandering has had an incredible affect on the partisan composition of Congress in
the past decade, since the 2011 redistricting. In the past four election cycles—2012, 2014, 2016,
and 2018—Republicans, who had sole control over redistricting in many more states than
Democrats following their wave election in 2010, have netted a total of 70 more seats than would
be proportional to their vote share, adjusting for equal voter turnout across districts. Without
adjusting for voter turnout, and just taking the nationwide House of Representatives popular
vote, Republicans have received 46 more seats than their vote share would translate to under a
proportional system. The distinction between adjusting for voter turnout and using the national
House popular vote is the difference between a single-member district system, like the current
American institution, mandating proportionality and a nationwide proportional system, which is
much less feasible in the context of our 250-year old republic; thus, the net 70 extra Republican
seats is the more representative measure of the impact Gerrymandering has had on the
composition of the House in the last decade.
.  .  .
Gerrymandering has been an American issue since this nation’s inception. Even before Elbridge
Gerry’s eponymous Gerrymander, in 1788 Patrick Henry redistricted the Virginia Congressional
map to pit James Madison against James Monroe. Henry, an anti-Federalist, sought to6
undermine Madison’s accelerating political career by forcing him to run against the popular
Monroe. Despite the Gerrymander, Madison won all the same. Thus, the first Gerrymander,
rather than being a product of Elbridge Gerry, seems, as William Rives wrote in the first major
biography of James Madison in 1859, “to have been first put in practice, though ineffectually, by
6 Thomas Rogers Hunter, “The First Gerrymander?: Patrick Henry, James Madison, James Monroe, and Virginia's
1788 Congressional Districting,” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 9, no. 3 (2011): 781-820,
doi:10.1353/eam.2011.0023; David Daley, Rat F**ked: Why Your Vote Doesn’t Count (New York: Liveright
Publishing, 2019), xviii.
5 Laura Royden and Michael Li, “Extreme Maps,” Brennan Center for Justice, May 9, 2017,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Extreme%20Maps%205.16_0.pdf; “Who Draws
the Lines?” All About Redistricting, accessed December 3, 2020, https://redistricting.lls.edu/who.php.
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the great Virginia orator and tribune [Patrick Henry], against Mr. Madison in the first election
of representatives under the Constitution.”7
The legacy of Gerrymandering extends, therefore, from the first American election to our most
recent, and continues to become an institution, rather than an exception.
The more widely recognized origin story of Gerrymandering is Massachusetts Governor
Elbridge Gerry’s infamous 1812 state senate map, which was designed to preserve the
Democratic-Republican—Gerry’s party’s—legislative majority. The new state senate map looked
so wild that one district, the Essex South District, included parts of 12 counties. Federalists
seized on the odd shape of the district, and a cartoonist drew wings on the district, called it the
Gerry-mander (as it somewhat resembled a salamander), and published it in the Boston Gazette.
Despite the media attention, Gerry was much more successful at packing and cracking the
Federalist opposition than Patrick Henry had been. According to David Daley’s 2017 book Rat
F**ked, “the Federalists won 51,766 votes that year and elected 11 senators, while Gerry’s party
won 50,164 votes but 29 senators.”8
The history of Patrick Henry’s and Elbridge Gerry’s Gerrymanders goes to show that
Gerrymandering is by no means a new problem facing our democracy—and it really is an
obstacle for American democratic expression. However, in the past 30 years—and especially in
the last decade—partisan Gerrymandering has become an especially pertinent obstacle, not just
for Democrats, for whom the Gerrymandering bells have primarily tolled, but for all citizens who
seek representation in “the people’s house.” Gerrymandering is, ultimately, as many editorial
boards at large publications have remarked, a way for politicians to pick their voters, rather than
voters choosing their representatives.9
Additionally, Gerrymandering is by no means—or should not be—a partisan issue for voters;
though the vast majority of Gerrymandered states today were redistricted by Republicans, this is
primarily a product of the fact that the vast majority of states were controlled by Republicans in
2011, the most recent redistricting year. In 2011, 26 state legislatures were under sole Republican
control, while only 17 state legislatures were under sole Democratic control. It should also be10
10 “State Partisan Composition,” National Conference of State Legislatures, November 8, 2020,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx.
9 New York Times Editorial Board, “Politicians Can Pick Their Voters, Thanks to the Supreme Court,” New York
Times, June 27, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/opinion/gerrymandering-supreme-court.html; Wayne
Dawkins, “In America, voters don't pick their politicians. Politicians pick their voters,” The Guardian, October 9,
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/09/virginia-gerrymandering-voting-
rights-act-black-voters.
8 Daley, Rat F**ked, xviii.
7 William C. Rives, History of the Life and Times of James Madison, 3 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1859-1868),
2:655n1.
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noted that in a much higher portion of those Democratically-controlled states (relative to
Republican-controlled states) the state legislature did not have power over the redistricting
process, as this was delegated to independent commissions, political commissions, or the courts.
Regardless, there are still some states that have Democratic Gerrymanders, the prime examples11
being Massachusetts and Maryland.
.  .  .
In the United States today we have the greatest and most severe Gerrymandering problem in
modern history. Though the problem did not begin in 2008 (it began, perhaps, in 1788), 2008 is a
good starting point for understanding our current predicament. 2008 was an incredible
Democratic wave election: Barack Obama was elected the first African-American president of
the United States, and, frankly, it wasn’t even close. Obama won 365 Electoral Votes to John12
McCain’s 173, with Obama flipping North Carolina, Florida, Virginia, Colorado, New Mexico,
Nevada, Ohio, Indiana, and Iowa. Obama came within a hair of also flipping Missouri and13
Montana. Democrats picked up 7 governorships and 8 senate seats, and held onto senate seats in
deep red states such as Montana, South Dakota, Arkansas, Louisiana, and West Virginia. Finally,
Democrats rounded out the landslide with 21 pickups in the House of Representatives, giving
them 257 seats compared with Republicans’ 178.
The 2008 election stunned Republicans: the editor of National Review, Rich Lowry, said of the
2008 election, “It’s a bad thing for the Republicans when you drill down into these states. It’s
like, where did all the Republicans go? Did they all move to Utah?”14
Some of the most important elections, however, were generally overlooked, as they still are: the
elections for state legislatures and the gubernatorial races. As I mentioned earlier, in the majority
of states, the redistricting process is controlled by the state legislature, often with gubernatorial
oversight. In 2008, the Democrats had majorities in most state legislatures, controlling 28 state
senates and 32 state houses. This continued a trend from the 2006 election, as Democrats15
gained majorities in 4 state legislatures in 2006 and gained another 4 in 2008. Despite the
importance of state legislative elections—they are important for many reasons, among them
being control over the Congressional redistricting process—both voters and the political parties
15 “2009 State and Legislative Partisan Composition,” National Conference of State Legislatures, January 26, 2009,
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/LegisControl_2009.pdf.
14 Daley, Rat F**ked, xviii.
13 “2004 Presidential General Election Results,” U.S. Election Atlas, accessed December 3, 2020,
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=2004.
12 “Election Results 2008,” New York Times, December 9, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/
results/president/map.html.
11 “Who Draws the Maps?” Brennan Center for Justice
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paid little attention to these unglamorous races. The 2008 legislative races fell where they may,
and little party money was spent on legislative elections, campaign funds being directed instead
to the Presidential, U.S. Senate, and House of Representatives races.
After the stunning Republican defeat in 2008, the Republican Party regrouped and came up with
a strategy to take back power in 2010 and beyond. The plan was, at the same time, both
ingenious and terrible for American democracy. It was called REDMAP, which stood for
Redistricting Majority Project. The idea was to invest heavily in competitive state legislative
races in the upcoming 2010 election, to take control of the redistricting process in as many states
as possible, and to Gerrymander Congressional maps across the United States. The goal was not
just to take back the House in 2010, but to maintain a majority in the legislative body for the next
decade at least.
Working in the GOP’s favor going into 2010 was, first, the fact that the president’s party
generally loses seats in the House of Representatives in midterm elections. Second, was the16
Citizens United ruling, which essentially allowed for unlimited “dark money” to pour into party
coffers from corporations and Super PACs. Third, the Democratic canary in the coal mine was17
the surprise election of Republican Scott Brown, who succeeded Ted Kennedy, the “liberal lion
of the Senate,” as Senator of Massachusetts. Brown’s election broke the Democratic18
supermajority in the Senate, severely hinduring President Obama’s push for universal health
care. And fourth, Democratic strategy did not focus on state legislatures like the Republican19
REDMAP did, and the Democrats did not fight for many of the critical state-level seats that
Republicans targeted.
Karl Rove, the Former White House Deputy Chief of Staff for President George W. Bush,
described REDMAP bluntly in the Wall Street Journal:
“There are 18 state legislative chambers that have four or fewer seats separating the two parties
that are important for redistricting. Seven of these are controlled by Republicans and the other
11 are controlled by Democrats, including the lower houses in Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana and
Pennsylvania. Republican strategists are focused on 107 seats in 16 states. Winning these seats
would give them control of drawing district lines for nearly 190 congressional seats.”20
20 Karl Rove, “The GOP Targets State Legislatures,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2010,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703862704575099670689398044.
19 Daley, Rat F**ked, xvi.
18 Michael Cooper, “G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats,” New York Times, January 19, 2010,
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html.
17 Daley, Rat F**ked, xv.
16 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Midterm Seat Loss Averages 37 for Unpopular Presidents,” Gallup, September 12, 2018,
https://news.gallup.com/poll/242093/midterm-seat-loss-averages-unpopular-presidents.aspx.
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David Daley put it well in RatF**ked:
“The assertion is so bold, yet so sensical, that one does not know whether to stand back and
admire the audaciousness, indict the Democrats for gross negligence and lack of imagination, or
simply howl over the undemocraticness of it all.”21
REDMAP worked. Republicans flipped 3 state senates and 6 state houses in 7 states by spending
about $8.2 million. That’s about as much money as was spent on a single U.S. House election,22
the race for the Michigan 7th district, in 2010. Republican control over redistricting in those23
same 7 states has netted Republicans 50 seats over the past four elections relative to their portion
of the vote. REDMAP has proven to be incredibly consequential and effective, maintaining a
Republican majority in the House of Representatives through the 2012, 2014, and 2016 elections,
despite Democrats receiving a majority of the popular vote in House elections in 2012.
REDMAP had its limits, however, and a series of Gerrymandering court cases throughout the
2010s slightly eroded Republican Gerrymanders. By 2016, three states—Florida, Texas, and
Virginia—had had their Republican-Gerrymandered maps modified by courts, losing
Republicans 2 House seats between 2014 and 2016, when the maps where redrawn.
The most significant victory for anti-Gerrymandering advocates in recent years came on January
22, 2018, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the 2011 Republican
legislature-drawn Congressional map, deeming it an unconstitutional partisan Gerrymander
under the Pennsylvania Constitution. The case, League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v.24
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, was unlike other cases brought by anti-Gerrymandering groups
in that it attempted to prove partisan Gerrymandering unconstitutional under state constitution
rather than the U.S. Constitution—I’ll discuss Supreme Court Gerrymandering cases more later.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found partisan Gerrymandering unconstitutional under Article
I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which reads: “Elections shall be free and equal;
and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right
of suffrage.”25
25 Jonathan Lai, “The legal team in the Pa. gerrymandering case set their sights on N.C. They just won again,” The
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 4, 2019, https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/nc-gerrymandering-
case-used-pa-model-20190904.html.
24 “League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,” Brennan Center for Justice,
October 29, 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/league-women-voters-pennsylvania
-v-commonwealth-pennsylvania.
23 T. W. Farnam and Nathaniel Vaughn Kelso, “Races with spending reported by interest groups,” Washington Post,
2010, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/campaign/2010/spending/race_list.html.
22 Ibid, xix.
21 Daley, Rat F**ked, xvii.
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The court ordered that the legislature draw new maps before the 2018 midterm election, but the
new maps were vetoed by Governor Tom Wolf, a Democrat, and the courts decided to draw the
maps themselves. The new, court-drawn maps eliminated the Republican Gerrymander, and
Democrats, who had previously held only 5 of Pennsylvania’s 18 Congressional seats (despite
receiving about 48.1% of the House popular vote in 2016), now control 9 of Pennsylvania’s 1826
Congressional seats (having received about 53.9% of the House popular vote in 2018).27
REDMAP was limited by the courts to some extent, but it would still require a Democratic wave
election at near-2008 levels in order for control of the House of Representatives to flip—in a
kind of miracle for the Democratic Party, 2018 was just that. 2018 was a blue wave, though the
Democratic resurgence was limited to a very great extent by REDMAP. In 2018, Democrats
received about 54.4% of the national House popular vote and 235 seats in the House. In28
contrast, in 2008, before REDMAP, Democrats received roughly 55.5% of the national House
popular vote and 257 seats. In other words, though Democrats received only 1.1% less of the29
2018 vote share compared to 2008, they won 22 fewer seats in 2018 than they won in 2008,
which represents about 5.1% of the seats in the House. Had Democrats translated their vote share
to Representatives at the same rate they did in 2008, Democrats would have won 17 more seats,
which would have put them at 252 seats in the House. Even in the bluest of elections,
Gerrymandering has limited Democratic representation in the House of Representatives.
For Democrats, ending Gerrymandering should be the priority—it should be a centerpiece of
national strategy and party platform. The Democratic Party got lucky in 2018, and taking the
House proves that the party still has not just energy in it, but also the support of a majority of
voters. But the state-level races that enabled REDMAP in the first place should be even more
concerning for the Democratic Party; once the 2020 elections are through, state legislatures in a
majority of states will be drawing the lines for the next decade, and retaking state governments is
going to be an uphill battle for Democrats. The reason for this is, as you may have already
guessed, Gerrymandering: in 2011, when the Congressional lines were redrawn, so were state
legislative lines, in many cases by the same state legislators who would run for reelection in the
new map. In 2018, one consequence of extreme Republican Gerrymandering at the state house
level was that in three states—Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Michigan—Democrats
29 “Election Results 2008,” New York Times.
28 “U.S. House Election Results 2018.” New York Times, May 15, 2019.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-house-elections.html.
27 This includes a simulated House election for the Pennsylvania 18th district, which was uncontested in 2018.
26 This includes simulated House elections for the Pennsylvania 3rd, 13th, and 18th districts, as these districts were
uncontested in 2016.
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received a majority of votes (54%, 53%, and 51%, respectively) but Republicans won control of
the legislature.30
In RatF**ked, by David Daley, Norman Ornstein, political scientist and scholar at the
conservative American Enterprise Institute, said, “[REDMAP] means basically that the whole
constitutional notion of the House as a mirror of popular views comes into jeopardy… Now, I
don’t believe the idea that a majority of the nationwide popular vote should automatically
translate to a majority of the seats. But the idea that almost nothing happens when you have a
broad public expressing its disfavor with the party in power and it doesn’t do anything? That’s
not good.”31
31 Daley, Rat F**ked, xxii.
30 Christopher Ingraham, “In at least three states, Republicans lost the popular vote but won the House,” Washington
Post, November 13, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/13/least-three-states-republicans-lost
-popular-vote-won-house/.
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Part II: The Judicial Problem
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Davis v. Bandemer that partisan Gerrymandering cases
were justiciable, meaning that they could be brought before courts. However, no functional32
definition of Gerrymandering was established: in fact, the criterion required for a map to be ruled
a Gerrymander were so rigorous that no map was deemed a partisan Gerrymander in federal
court between 1986 and 2004. Additionally, Bandemer did not, by any means, determine33
partisan Gerrymandering to be unconstitutional. The Indiana General Assembly map, which was
challenged in Bandemer, had awarded 57 of 100 seats to Republicans despite Republicans
receiving only about 48.1% of statewide votes. Though the Supreme Court ruled that the case
was justiciable, they did not strike down the map as an unconstitutional partisan Gerrymander.
Racial Gerrymandering, in contrast, is unconstitutional, as established by the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 and backed up by a series of Supreme Court cases in the past thirty years. It should be34
noted, however, that the Voting Rights Act has since been essentially gutted by the Supreme
Court; nevertheless, the language on racial Gerrymandering and minority-majority districts35
remains somewhat strong, though the same cannot be said, of course, for federal oversight of
state-run elections.36
Regardless, in 2004, the issue of partisan Gerrymandering and its justiciability was again brought
before the Supreme Court in Vieth v. Jubelirer. In Vieth, the plaintiffs were three registered
Democrats in Pennsylvania, who charged that the Pennsylvania General Assembly, which at the
time was controlled by Republicans, had committed an unconstitutionally partisan Gerrymander
against Democrats in the 2001 Congressional redistricting.37
Though the plurality of the court—Scalia, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas—found partisan
Gerrymandering to be nonjusticiable, they did not garner a majority; Justice Kennedy joined the
plurality only in ruling against the specific anti-Gerrymandering plaintiffs in Vieth and did not
join the plurality in overturning Davis v. Bandemer.38
38 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 306, 1 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring): “While agreeing with the plurality that the
complaint the appellants filed in the District Court must be dismissed, and while understanding that great caution is
37 “Vieth v. Jubelirer,” Brennan Center for Justice, April 28, 2004,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/vieth-v-jubelirer.
36 See Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, no. 13-895, 575 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015), Cooper v.
Harris, no. 15-1262, 581 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
35 See Shelby County v. Holder, no. 12-96, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
34 For cases relating to racial Gerrymandering, see Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952
(1996), Shelby County v. Holder, no. 12-96, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), Cooper v. Harris, no. 15-1262, 581 U.S. __, 137
S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
33 Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap,” University of
Chicago Law Review 82 (2015): 832–833, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457468.
32 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
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Vieth did, however, reject essentially every conceived standard to measure Gerrymandering
developed before 2004. To demonstrate how substantial that rejection was, here’s a list of
methods to measure Gerrymandering that Vieth basically eliminated, as described in Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap by Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee:
“Both the Bandemer plurality’s approach and that of Justice Powell were judicially
unmanageable, in the Vieth plurality’s view. So too was the appellant’s proposal of (1)
predominant partisan intent, (2) systematic packing and cracking of a party’s voters, and (3) a
party’s inability to translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats. And so too were Justice
Stevens’s intent-based tests, Justice Souter’s elaborate five-part framework focused on disregard
for traditional districting principles, and Justice Breyer’s minority entrenchment standard.”39
However, Justice Kennedy did leave the door open for a possible standard for Gerrymandering to
emerge in the future. Two years later, in 2006, League of United Latin American Citizens
(LULAC) v. Perry once again introduced the questions of partisan Gerrymandering justiciability
and workable standards for Gerrymandering. LULAC dealt with the aptly named issue of40
“re-redistricting”: in 2003, the Texas legislature re-drew the maps despite it not being a decennial
redistricting year. The Texas congressional maps had previously been court-drawn, and had41
favored Republicans slightly. Following the 2003 re-redistricting, the maps greatly advantaged
Republicans, and they picked up five congressional seats in the 2004 election.
A similar re-redistricting had occurred in Colorado the same year, and Colorado Attorney
General Ken Salazar had filed suit against Colorado Secretary of State Donetta Davidson. The
Colorado Supreme Court ruled in Salazar’s favor, striking down the new maps as a violation of
the Colorado Constitution. However, as Salazar v. Davidson struck down the re-redistricting
under state constitution, the precedent did not directly translate to LULAC, as the plaintiffs
argued that the new Texas maps violated the U.S. Constitution.42
The plaintiffs in LULAC utilized partisan symmetry measures to argue that the new Texas maps
were Gerrymandered. Partisan bias, a kind of partisan symmetry measurement method, compares
a party’s seat share to their statewide vote share, estimating the outcome (in terms of seats) if the
42 People Ex Rel. Salazar v. Davidson 79 P.3d 1221 (2003).
41 “LULAC v. Perry (Sup. Ct. consolidated cases) Session v. Perry (E.D. Tex.),” Brennan Center for Justice, June 28,
2006, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/lulac-v-perry-sup-ct-consolidated-cases-session
-v-perry-ed-tex.
40 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
39 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 841–842.
necessary when approaching this subject, I would not foreclose all possibility of judicial relief if some limited and
precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting cases.”
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party had received 50% of the statewide vote. The difference between the percentage of seats a
party would receive in a hypothetical election in which the aggregate vote is split between two
parties and 50% is the partisan bias of a map. For example, if there are two parties in a43
state—Party A and Party B—and Party A receives only 45% of the seats while capturing 50% of
the statewide vote, the map has a 5% partisan bias in favor of Party B.
In LULAC, Justice Stevens was the most adamant advocate of partisan symmetry, but the other
three liberal justices—Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer—and Justice Kennedy did express some
interest. However, Justice Kennedy did have some problems with partisan symmetry, problems44
that he hinted might be addressed in future methods to measure Gerrymandering.45
Justice Kennedy had four main concerns with partisan symmetry. First, he was concerned with
the “uniform partisan swing” assumption. Uniform partisan swing is the assumption that, for
calculating a hypothetical election (in the case of partisan symmetry, a hypothetical election with
a 50/50 statewide vote split), the vote share would change by the same amount in every district.
In other words, it is the idea that between elections, there is the same “swing” in every district.
For example, as Stephanopoulos and McGhee described in Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Efficiency Gap, “if Democrats received 45 percent of the vote in a state, and a researcher wanted
to know how many seats they would have won if they had received 50 percent, the researcher
would simply add 5 percentage points to the actual Democratic vote share in each district.”46
Kennedy’s problem with uniform partisan swing was that it makes assumptions that are often
inaccurate and unfounded. A district’s swing may be influenced by any number of factors
uniform partisan swing doesn’t take into account, such as the candidates themselves—their
incumbency, their politics, their record, etc.—or the political geography of the state—the number
of swing and independent voters varies greatly between urban, suburban, and rural districts.47
Kennedy’s second objection to partisan symmetry, which directly relates to the first, was: “Even
assuming a court could choose reliably among different models of shifting voter preferences, we
are wary of adopting a constitutional standard that invalidates a map based on unfair results
that would occur in a hypothetical state of affairs.” These hypothetical elections result from the48
use of the assumption of uniform partisan swing.
48 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 13 (2006) (Kennedy, J.).
47 Ibid, 845, 859–860.
46 Ibid, 845 note 83.
45 Ibid, 845–846.
44 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 844.
43 Bernard Grofman and Gary King, “The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan
Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry,” Election Law Journal 2, no. 1 (2007): 2–35,
https://gking.harvard.edu/files/jp.pdf.
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Third, Kennedy questioned where the threshold of partisan bias should be, above which a plan
would be considered unconstitutional. Neither the plaintiffs nor any of the amicus briefs
addressed the threshold, which, in retrospect, seems to be something of a gross oversight on the
part of anti-Gerrymandering advocates. Kennedy sought a well-established threshold which
would provide the court with a clear definition of an unconstitutional partisan Gerrymander—the
plaintiffs in LULAC did not provide this.49
Fourth, and finally, Justice Kennedy wrote that partisan symmetry alone could not persuade a
court to strike down a map. Instead, asymmetry could provide one perspective on a map, among
other measures and considerations. Thus he wrote:
“Without altogether discounting its utility in redistricting planning and litigation, we conclude
asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”50
.  .  .
In 2018, a trio of high-profile Gerrymandering cases were argued before the Supreme Court. The
first, Lamone v. Benisek, dealt with the Maryland congressional map drawn in 2011 by the
Democratic Maryland General Assembly. The second, Rucho v. Common Cause, regarded the51
remedial 2016 North Carolina congressional map, which was introduced by the
Republican-controlled state legislature after the previous map was struck down as an
unconstitutional racial Gerrymander. The third case, Gill v. Whitford, was about the Wisconsin52
state house plan that was enacted in 2011 by the Republican-controlled state legislature.53
In Lamone v. Benisek, the conservative wing of the Supreme Court—Roberts, Thomas, Alito,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—formed the majority opinion and ruled that, contrary to Davis v.
Bandemer, partisan Gerrymandering is nonjusticiable, a serious blow to anti-Gerrymandering
advocates hoping for a strong nationwide ruling on the constitutionality of Gerrymandering. The
reason for the ruling, as described in an article from the Brennan Center for Justice, was:
53 “Gill v. Whitford,” Brennan Center for Justice, July 3, 2019,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/gill-v-whitford.
52 “Rucho v. Common Cause,” Brennan Center for Justice, August 1, 2019,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/rucho-v-common-cause.
51 “Lamone v. Benisek,” Brennan Center for Justice, July 29, 2019,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/lamone-v-benisek.
50 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 13 (2206) (Kennedy, J.).
49 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 845–846.
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“In the Supreme Court’s 5-4 opinion in the cases out of North Carolina and Maryland, Chief
Justice John Roberts explained that the federal courts cannot hear partisan gerrymandering
cases because there are no “discernable and manageable standards” with which to identify
when these gerrymanders are unconstitutional.”54
Following the rulings on Lamone v. Benisek and Rucho v. Common Cause, Gill v. Whitford was
dismissed by the Supreme Court on July 2nd, 2019.55
In the trio of cases, the plaintiffs used the Efficiency Gap, a method to measure Gerrymandering,
as evidence of partisan Gerrymandering, among other mathematical tools. However, the56
Efficiency Gap was dismissed by the majority in Lamone, Rucho, and Gill and by Chief Justice
Roberts, who said of the Efficiency Gap, “I can only describe [it] as sociological
gobbledygook.”
The Efficiency Gap is not sociological gobbledygook. In League of Women Voters of
Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the recent anti-Gerrymandering success in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that struck down and replaced the state’s
Republican-Gerrymandered Congressional map, George Washington University political
scientist Christopher Warshaw used the Efficiency Gap as a Gerrymandering measure before the
court. The Efficiency Gap was used in conjunction with other measures to persuade the court,57
possibly producing a model to fight Gerrymanders under other state constitutions.
This model was used again in Common Cause v. Lewis last year. That case concerned, yet again,
the Republican-drawn North Carolina congressional map. However, this time the maps were
successfully struck down and redrawn by the North Carolina Supreme Court, which ruled in the
plaintiff’s favor on state constitution grounds. The new map is now in place and will be used in58
the 2020 House elections. Again, the Efficiency Gap was used by the plaintiff as evidence of
partisan Gerrymandering, furthering the continued importance of the Efficiency Gap in state and
federal-level court rulings on Gerrymandering.
58 Will Doran, “After maps struck down in NC gerrymandering lawsuit, top Republican leader won’t appeal,” The
News & Observer, September 3, 2019, https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/
article234668747.html.
57 Issie Lapowski, “The Geeks Who Put a Stop to Pennsylvania's Partisan Gerrymandering,” Wired, February 20,
2018, https://www.wired.com/story/pennsylvania-partisan-gerrymandering-experts/.
56 Garrett Epps, “The Supreme Court's Choice on Partisan Gerrymandering,” The Atlantic, March 28, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/the-supreme-courts-choice-on-partisan-gerrymandering/55666
1/.
55 Brennan Center for Justice, “Gill v. Whitford.”
54 Yurij Rudensky and Annie Lo, “Supreme Court Refuses to Stop Partisan Gerrymandering,” Brennan Center for
Justice, June 27, 2019, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/supreme-court-refuses
-stop-partisan-gerrymandering.
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The Efficiency Gap has been touted by the anti-Gerrymandering movement as a solution to
judicial calls for a better method to calculate Gerrymandering, if not at the federal level, then at
least at the state level. But the Efficiency Gap has some serious problems, and other, more
effective solutions are available.
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2. Wasted Votes
The Efficiency Gap and a Solution to Gerrymandering
Part I: Breaking a Quorum
In 2000, prior to the 2001 nationwide redistricting, the Texas congressional delegation was
comprised of 18 Democrats and 12 Republicans, slightly favoring Democrats, who had received
approximately the same 48% of the statewide House popular vote as Republicans. In 2001, the
Republican-controlled legislature attempted to redraw the lines and Gerrymander the
congressional map to disadvantage Democrats. However, this effort ultimately failed, as the new
maps did not pass the state legislature, and the courts stepped in and drew the maps themselves.59
In the 2002 House elections, Democrats won in 17 of Texas’s 32 districts, despite losing the
statewide House popular vote. The Republican legislature, seeing its failure in the 2002
elections, decided to redistrict the congressional map yet again, despite it not being a decennial
redistricting year.
Texas Republicans made redistricting a priority primarily because the U.S. House was fairly
close between Democrats and Republicans, with Democrats holding 204 seats to Republicans’
229. If Democrats did well in the next House elections in 2004, they could take the House and
derail President Bush’s policy agenda. In a predominantly Republican state like Texas, the
legislature reasoned, seats were far more vulnerable, especially if entrenched Democratic
incumbents could be removed by a Gerrymander.60
Under the guidance of U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, Republicans drew up a map that
would ensure a Republican-majority congressional delegation. In How Democracies Die, authors
Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt wrote: “The new map left six Democratic congressmen
especially vulnerable. The Plan was pure hardball. As one analyst posited, it “was as partisan as
the Republicans thought the law would allow.”61
Democrats in the Texas state legislature, desperate to stop the Gerrymander, turned to Jim
Dunnam, the chairman of the State House Democratic Caucus. Malcolm Gladwell interviewed
Dunnam in Season 3, Episode 1 of his eclectic podcast, Revisionist History. In the interview,62
62 Malcolm Gladwell, “Divide and Conquer,” Revisionist History, May 16, 2018, audio,
http://revisionisthistory.com/episodes/21-divide-and-conquer.
61 Ibid.
60 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2018), 154.
59 Ed Lavandera, “Texas House paralyzed by Democratic walkout,” CNN, May 19, 2003,
https://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/13/texas.legislature/.
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Dunnam said, “I had members coming up to me and say, ‘You know, Jim, you've got to do
something,’ and I was like, ‘What are we going to do?’ I said, ‘Well, we can bust the quorum.’”
The Texas Assembly is comprised of 150 representatives; at the time, 88 of those were
Republicans and 62 were Democrats. A quorum in the Assembly is 100, so Dunnam organized63
for 50 Democrats (as well as himself) to flee to nearby Oklahoma, as the Speaker of the House
could issue arrest warrants for the insurgent Democratic legislators while they were still in the
state.
Again, here’s Gladwell: “Dunnam hires buses, gets everyone to meet at a hotel in Austin, does a
headcount; 50 plus himself. Doesn't tell anyone where they're headed or when they're coming
back; need to know basis only. It's an undercover operation.
Monday comes and when the Republicans are ready for their triumphant vote, they suddenly
realize they don't have a quorum. They launch a manhunt for the missing Democrats…”64
The Republicans were shocked and aggravated by the Democratic exodus, with Republican
Governor Rick Perry calling the maneuver “cowardly and childish.” Texas Republican
Chairwoman Sue Weddington said of the Democrats who were now holed up in Oklahoma,
“They may believe they are clever, but the majority of Texans see them as childish.”65
Republicans were so frustrated in their search for the missing Democrats that, according to a
CNN article, “In Austin, Republicans exhibited a deck of cards bearing the lawmakers’
pictures—similar to those issued to U.S. troops to help identify fugitive Iraqi leaders—and milk
cartons bearing the images of the missing lawmakers.”66
After four days of self-imposed exile in middle-of-nowhere Oklahoma, the Texas House
retracted the redistricting bill. The Democratic victory was short-lived, however, as Governor
Rick Perry called a special legislative session that summer, and the Democrats were caught too
unaware to organize another walkout. When the bill was introduced in the state senate, Levitsky
and Ziblatt described in How Democracies Die: “The Democrats, following the precedent of
their House colleagues, tried to thwart the bill in absentia by boarding a plane and flying to
Albuquerque, New Mexico. They remained there for more than a month, until Senator John
Whitmire (soon to be known as “Quitmire”) gave in and returned to Austin.” Whitmire’s67
surrender effectively signaled the end of the 2003 Democratic legislative rebellion, and the
congressional lines were redrawn.
67 Levitsky and Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, 154.
66 Ibid.
65 Lavandera, “Texas House.”
64 Gladwell, “Divide and Conquer.”
63 Lavandera, “Texas House.”
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The new map succeeded in what it was designed to do: turn the map red, regardless of—or
despite—the will of the people. In the 2004 elections, Republicans flipped 6 seats in Texas,
winning 21 of Texas’s 32 congressional seats—that represents about 65.6% of the Texas
congressional delegation, despite the GOP receiving only 57.7% of the statewide House popular
vote. Sixteen years later, the Texas congressional delegation looks remarkably similar: Texas is
now represented by 13 Democrats and 23 Republicans, despite Democrats’ vote share increasing
from 39.0% in 2004 to 47.1% in 2018.68
.  .  .
Following the 2003 Texas re-redistricting, LULAC (the League of United Latin American
Citizens) filed suit against then-Texas governor Rick Perry. The case eventually reached the
Supreme Court in 2006. I talked about LULAC v. Perry in part 1 of The Consent of the
Governed, but it is worth discussing further, as it paved the way for future partisan
gerrymandering cases and the introduction of the efficiency gap. Additionally, the story behind
LULAC demonstrates the visceral nature of the gerrymandering issue and its importance for
American democracy.
LULAC relied on partisan bias measures to prove the presence of partisan gerrymandering, and
argued, primarily, that the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the First Amendment. The majority of the court expressed interest in
partisan bias but ruled that the Texas redistricting did not violate the Constitution. Furthermore, it
ruled that, as long as states redistricted at least once every decade, they could re-redistrict as
much as they wanted. The court did, however, order the Texas 23rd District to be redrawn, as
they determined it to be an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, violating the Voting Rights Act.
LULAC is significant not for the specifics of the Texas redistricting case, but because Supreme
Court Justice Kennedy, along with the 4 liberal justices, hinted that they might be open to ruling
on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering in the future. Two years earlier, in the Vieth
ruling, Justice Kennedy had expressed this openness: “[N]ew technologies may produce new
methods of analysis that make more evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders
impose on the representational rights of voters and parties.”69
However, Kennedy would only rule if the plaintiffs utilized a measure of gerrymandering that
was superior to partisan bias in four key areas. First, it could not rely on the assumption of
uniform partisan swing; second, it could not use hypothetical elections; third, it must have a set
69 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 306, 8 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68 “U.S. House Election Results 2018,” New York Times.
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threshold of unconstitutionality, which was based on historic election data; and fourth, it must be
used in conjunction with other comprehensive measures of gerrymandering.70
70 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 845–846.
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Part II: The Efficiency Gap
The efficiency gap, a measure of partisan gerrymandering introduced in Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap by Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee in 2015,
was a product of LULAC in that it hoped to address Kennedy’s four requirements and to pave the
way for a definitive Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering. It
functioned as a calculation of each party’s wasted votes across a state, reasoning that a
gerrymandering party would attempt, in the redrawing of district lines, to make the opposition
party waste more votes than the gerrymandering party. As Stephanopoulos and McGhee put it:71
“A gerrymander is simply a district plan that results in one party wasting many more votes than
its adversary.”72
Again, Stephanopoulos and McGhee: “‘Inefficient’ [wasted] votes are those that do not directly
contribute to victory. Thus, any vote for a losing candidate is wasted by definition, but so too is
any vote beyond the 50 percent threshold needed (in a two-candidate race) to win a seat.” This73
reflects the two primary tactics employed in the gerrymander of a map: “packing” and
“cracking.” Packing refers to the packing of opposition-party voters into as few districts as
possible, in which opposition candidates easily win with extremely high margins. Packing large
populations of opposition voters dilutes the ability of opposition voters to elect candidates of
their choice in the rest of the map, and the remaining opposition can then be “cracked” across the
remaining districts, further diluting opposition-voters’ power. For example, in the current
Maryland congressional map, Republican voters are packed into the 1st District, such that
Republicans consistently win in the district with a 20-point or higher margin. In the rest of the
state, Republican voting power is cracked, and in 2018, Republicans averaged only about 27.9%
of the vote in the other 7 districts, adjusting for voter turnout. The goal of a gerrymander, as
demonstrated by Maryland’s current Democratic gerrymander, is to waste less votes than the
other party by packing and cracking the opposition vote into oblivion.
The efficiency gap calculates the wasted votes for each party by district, first, and, second,
translates that data into a simple, elegant number. The total number of wasted votes for each
party in a state is calculated, and that is then compared to the number of seats each party won in
that state. Stephanopoulos and McGhee defined the efficiency gap as “the difference between the
parties’ respective wasted votes, divided by the total number of votes cast in an election.” The74
74 Ibid, 851.
73 Ibid, 850–851.
72 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 850.
71 Eric Petry, “How the Efficiency Gap Works,” Brennan Center for Justice,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/How_the_Efficiency_Gap_Standard_Works.pdf.
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number produced by the calculations is a percentage, which, in the case of congressional
elections, is then translated into a partisan advantage in terms of congressional seats.
Put into practice, the efficiency gap reveals the vast scope and depth of partisan gerrymandering
across the country. In Extreme Maps by Michael Li and Laura Royden, an analysis using the
efficiency gap found that “three states had a gap of at least two seats—the standard for
presumptive unconstitutionality proposed by Stephanopolous and McGhee—in every election
since 2012: Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. Republicans had sole control of the
map-drawing processes in all three states, and all of the seat gaps favor Republicans.” The75
Brennan Center study, however, calculated only efficiency gaps for states with six or more
districts, as Stephanopolous and McGhee recommend for using the efficiency gap.76
In my own research, I calculated the efficiency gap for all states (including states with less than
six districts), going back to 2012 and including the 2018 midterm elections. I found that there are
currently six Republican gerrymanders—Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio,
and Wisconsin—and two Democratic gerrymanders—Connecticut and Massachusetts. Arkansas
and Connecticut were not included in the Brennan Center report because they both have less than
six congressional districts—Arkansas has four and Connecticut five. Seven other77
states—Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas—had an
efficiency gap of greater than two congressional seats in favor of Republicans at some point in
the last four election cycles but were disqualified from being deemed gerrymanders because of
the results of sensitivity tests.
Sensitivity testing, as described by Stephanopoulos and McGhee, is designed to measure the
strength of gerrymanders in the face of large vote shifts between parties. Because the efficiency
gap of a plan can change dramatically between elections depending on election results, it is
important to measure map shifts both over time and in the face of large voter shifts. Thus,
Stephanopoulos and McGhee argue that a map should be invalidated only if its efficiency gap
exceeds the two-seat threshold at some point in its lifetime and the map never favors the
opposition party if the vote shifts by 7.5% in favor of either party.78
.  .  .
The appeal of the efficiency gap is, above all, its simplicity: it captures in a single, tidy number
all the “packing” and “cracking” that goes into a partisan gerrymander. On a fundamental level,
78 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 889.
77 Ibid, 22.
76 Ibid, 17.
75 Royden and Li, “Extreme Maps,” 6.
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it expresses the incredible harm that gerrymandering produces. Again, here’s Stephanopoulos
and McGhee: “After voters have decided which party they support—based on whatever criteria
they choose, including the attractiveness of each party’s policy agenda—the votes cast by
supporters of the gerrymandering party translate more effectively into representation and policy
than do those cast by the opposing party’s supporters. The gerrymandering party enjoys a
political advantage not because of its greater popularity, but rather because of the configuration
of district lines. The parties do not compete on a level playing field.”79
Mathematically, the efficiency gap does have some benefits, and the measure generally fulfills all
four of Kennedy’s criteria established in LULAC. First, the efficiency gap does not utilize the
assumption of uniform partisan swing; in fact, it relies almost completely on actual election
results, and translates real-world data into a gerrymandering calculation, thus fulfilling
Kennedy’s second requirement. Partisan bias, in contrast, requires the formation of a
hypothetical scenario in which the parties split the statewide vote equally. Occasionally, this
hypothetical vote shift can produce a counterintuitive result where seats are hypothetically given
to the real-world losing party—this phenomenon is called the “counterfactual window.” It is80
manifestly impossible for the efficiency gap to produce the  “counterfactual window.”
The efficiency gap succeeds in Kennedy’s third criterion because the two-seat threshold of
unconstitutionality for congressional redistricting is not arbitrary; on the contrary, the threshold
was determined using historical election data from the 1960s through the 2010s. From
Stephanopoulos and McGhee: “A gap of two or more seats placed a plan in the worst 14 percent
of all plans in this era, roughly 1.5 standard deviations from the mean… A two-seat gap therefore
indicates that a district plan is gerrymandered to an unusual extent and that the gerrymandering
has an unusually large impact on the makeup of the House as a whole.”81
Kennedy’s fourth criterion has more to do with the legal strategy of anti-gerrymandering
plaintiffs (their use of the efficiency gap in conjunction with other gerrymandering measures)
than with the efficiency gap itself, but Stephanopoulos and McGhee recognize that other
strategies should also be used to build a strong case: “Of course, a mere assertion that a large
efficiency gap followed inexorably from the application of a legitimate state policy would fail to
rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality. A state would have to present concrete proof that its







The efficiency gap also excels in its historic assessment of gerrymandering over the past 50
years. In states with eight or more congressional districts, the net efficiency gap from 1972 to
2012 is remarkably close to zero. This functions as a solid foundation that modern83
gerrymanders can be measured against; it also further credits Stephanopoulos and McGhee’s two
congressional seat threshold.
Additionally, the efficiency gap does not utilize proportionality as a baseline to measure a
gerrymander against. This is a benefit in court, more than anything, as the Supreme Court has
been reluctant—if not opposed—to striking down maps where the plaintiff so much as mentions
proportionality. The Supreme Court stated in the Davis v. Bandemer plurality opinion that “the
mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional
discrimination.” The efficiency gap’s implied ideal relationship between seat and vote share is84
not proportional. From Stephanopoulos and McGhee: “Each additional percentage point of vote
share for a party should result in an extra two percentage points of seat share.”85
Stephanopoulos and McGhee explain this disparity as a “winner’s bonus.”
Finally, the cross-election sensitivity testing, in addition to further narrowing the field of
candidate gerrymanders, can be used as a measure in itself. The ability of a plan to entrench
incumbents despite the will of the voters is directly measured by sensitivity testing.
.  .  .
However, though the efficiency gap checks most of the right boxes, it has many problems that,
though not entirely disqualifying the use of the efficiency gap, recommend the measure play a
secondary role in gerrymandering jurisprudence. Its problems are, in fact, so great that if adopted
as the national gerrymandering standard, it would strike down some maps that are fair and
maintain some maps that are not.
Kennedy’s second and third requirements are violated by the efficiency gap when you take into
account uncontested races and sensitivity testing. When using the efficiency gap, uncontested
elections—in which only one of the two major parties fields a candidate—can throw off the
statewide calculation because it gives an unfair representation of party vote split in a district. For
example, in a district that would have a 60%–40% split between Party A and Party B if they both
85 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 854.
84 Mira Bernstein and Moon Duchin, “A Formula Goes to Court,” Notices of the American Mathematical Society 64,




fielded a candidate, if only Party A fields a candidate, it looks like 100% of the vote goes to
Party A. This can greatly distort the efficiency gap statewide.
In order to adjust for uncontested elections, political scientists input hypothetical election results
in uncontested districts: “We strongly discourage analysts from either dropping uncontested
races from the computation or treating them as if they produced unanimous support for a party.”
This can be done in a variety of ways: in my analysis I used past House and presidential86
election data, as well as the Cook Political Report’s Partisan Voter Index, which measures
district-level partisan lean. These uncontested races are, put simply, hypothetical elections.
Benjamin Plener Cover wrote in Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering, a study published in the
Stanford Law Review: “The efficiency gap may be particularly appealing—especially to Justice
Kennedy—because it relies upon directly observed election data rather than hypothetical results.
But if calculating the gap requires imputing hypothetical results, and if the size of the gap
depends in substantial part on which method an analyst selects, the gap is less of a
straightforward measure of real-world data.”87
Additionally, the critical sensitivity testing also violates Kennedy’s second and third criteria
because statewide vote shares must be shifted to gauge the strength of gerrymanders. The result
of the shift is a kind of hypothetical election.
The efficiency gap is also somewhat problematic in solving Kennedy’s third requirement (that of
establishing a workable threshold of unconstitutionality) because the two-congressional-seat
threshold discounts gerrymanders in states with less than eight seats. Twenty-nine states (a
majority) have fewer than eight congressional seats, comprising a total of 98 seats in the House,
and writing them off as impossible to gerrymander is both factually wrong and democratically
harmful. Wendy Tam Cho wrote in Measuring Partisan Fairness, an essay published in the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review: “In their analysis, Stephanopoulos and McGhee limit
their study to states with at least eight congressional districts… [T]his reduces the volatility that
arises with smaller state delegations. A general measure of partisan fairness should, however,
work for any size delegation [...] If the efficiency gap calculation is not viable for any size
delegation, this is indicative of underlying measurement issues.”88
One of the major problems with the efficiency gap, outside of Justice Kennedy’s requirements
established in LULAC, is that it discounts individual district results—and the competitiveness of
88 Wendy K. Tam Cho, “Measuring Partisan Fairness,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online 166, no. 17
(2017): 20 note 10, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1198&context=
penn_law_review_online.
87 Benjamin Plener Cover, “Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering: An Evaluation of the Efficiency Gap Proposal,”
Stanford Law Review (2018): 1188, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3019540.
86 Ibid, 867.
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those races—in favor of a statewide measure. The efficiency gap does not account for the
competitiveness of district-level elections and can register close races as extremely biased in
favor of a party: “EG behaves very erratically if there are districts with competitive races,
because a genuinely close outcome will produce lopsided vote wastage, but it is unpredictable
which side this falls on.” For example, if Party A receives 52 votes and Party B receives 4889
votes in a district (a close election by any standard), the efficiency gap calculates that Party A
wastes 2 votes and Party B wastes all 48 of its votes. This produces an efficiency gap in the
district of 0.46 congressional seats in favor of Party A, despite the election being within 4%.
In wave election years, in which the vast majority of competitive elections are won by one party,
the statewide efficiency gap can be skewed to a very great extent. In 2018, for example, New
Jersey dramatically shifted toward Democrats in House elections, flipping four Republican seats.
All three competitive seats in the state elected Democrats (I define competitive races as elections
in which the winning candidate’s margin was 10% or less). Because all competitive races went
blue, however, the efficiency gap produced a 3.81 congressional seat advantage for Democrats
statewide. In non-wave elections, New Jersey generally splits its competitive elections equally
between Democrats and Republicans; this is reflected in its efficiency gap across 2016, 2014,
and 2012, which averaged 1.22 congressional seats in favor of Republicans. Competitiveness is a
critical measure in understanding the responsiveness of a map—the efficiency gap generally fails
in this understanding.
Compounding the efficiency gap’s inability to register competitiveness is the uncommon but
possible scenario of the “bipartisan gerrymander.” The bipartisan gerrymander, as described by
Tam Cho, is “where the two parties, majority and minority, join forces to create a sweetheart
deal where both parties are protected in safe seats, thereby preserving the status quo via
non-competitive elections. Bipartisan gerrymanders, while usually not biasing one party over the
other, lack responsiveness to the electorate.” The efficiency gap ultimately does not measure90
responsiveness, only the net wasted votes across a state; if both parties work together to waste
many more votes statewide, and there are approximately the same number of wasted votes for
both parties, the efficiency gap will register the map as fair, despite individual voter power being
essentially diluted into nonexistence.
Stephanopoulos and McGhee’s response to these problems is sensitivity testing, but, as
mentioned earlier, this requires the input of hypothetical election results. Thus, the efficiency gap
does not circumvent the problems that plagued partisan symmetry methods when brought before
courts.
90 Tam Cho, “Measuring Partisan Fairness,” 33.
89 Bernstein and Duchin, “A Formula Goes to Court,” 1022.
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The efficiency gap can also produce counterintuitive results, especially in districts in which one
party wins by a landslide. If the vote is split 75%–25% between parties, the efficiency gap of the
district will be zero, even though the district may have been heavily gerrymandered in favor of
the winning party. Additionally, if a party wins with more than 75% of the vote in a district, the
efficiency gap will be in favor of the losing party. Though Stephanopoulos and McGhee91
recognize this problem, they argue that it is so rare that “this is not a problem that is especially
relevant to real-world redistricting.” That is not what I find; for example, in the 2018 midterm92
elections, in New York there were six congressional districts where Democrats won with greater
than 75% of the vote. Additionally, there were six uncontested races won by Democrats, and93
though Democrats flipped three competitive seats, the efficiency gap produces a 3.80
congressional seat bias in favor of Republicans statewide—this is primarily a result of the
counterintuitive efficiency gap in districts won by Democrats with greater than 75% of the vote.
The sensitivity testing prescribed by Stephanopoulos and McGhee can also be problematic. The
procedure to conduct the sensitivity testing is vague, the Stephanopoulos paper reading: “We
suggest shifting the actual election results by percentages derived from historical data—up to 7.5
percent in each direction for congressional plans.” This indefinite language can lead different94
efficiency gap analysis to different results. Moreover, shifting statewide vote shares by up to
7.5% can lead to unrealistic results; besides, finding a reasonable vote shift for a state leads
further and further down the road of hypothetical elections, which the efficiency gap is supposed
to avoid altogether. Ultimately, if conducting sensitivity testing is so critical for calculating the
efficiency gap, one could simply create a measure of gerrymandering that is just the sensitivity
testing component of the efficiency gap, with some adjustments; in fact, this new measure would
be almost mathematically equivalent to partisan bias.
Another problem with the efficiency gap is its rejection of proportionality. The efficiency gap’s
disproportionality may be a benefit in the court system, as it has continued to reject
proportionality as a gerrymandering standard, but I see little reason for a standard to be
disproportionate. In actuality, any gerrymandering measure must be measured against something,
and the efficiency gap, while not being measured against proportionality, is measured against an
implied ideal seat distribution. The efficiency gap, as Stephanopoulos and McGhee wrote, “is a
measure of undeserved seat share: the proportion of seats a party receives that it would not have
received under a plan with equal wasted votes.” Adjusting for these undeserved seats produces95
an odd and counterintuitive seat distribution: in 2018, the efficiency gap has an implied ideal
95 Ibid, 854.
94 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 889.
93 “U.S. House Election Results 2018,” New York Times.
92 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 864.
91 Bernstein and Duchin, “A Formula Goes to Court,” 1022.
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distribution of 268 Democratic and 167 Republican representatives. Some states’ distributions
look somewhat reasonable, such as Colorado’s 4 Democrats and 3 Republicans, while others do
not, like New York’s 25 Democrats and 2 Republicans.
In addition to the efficiency gap’s implied ideal seat distribution, the efficiency gap actually
penalizes proportionality, instead relying on double-proportionality. According to
Stephanopoulos and McGhee, again, “Each additional percentage point of vote share for a party
should result in an extra two percentage points of seat share.” Not only is this counterintuitive96
and unjustified, it is anti-democratic; there is no reason seats should not be allocated proportional
to votes across a state. Indeed, politicians are far more responsive to the preferences of their97
constituents if individual voter power is increased rather than diluted; this is only possible if each
vote, regardless of political geography or any number of other factors, has the power to remove
or maintain politicians, which, in turn, is only enabled by some degree of proportionality.
Double-proportionality, as utilized in the efficiency gap, is meaningless and arbitrary—though, I
admit, it may have its advantages in court.98
There are a number of other problems with the efficiency gap—such as its inability to take into
account political geography, its nongranularity, and its conflation of wasted votes cast for
winning and losing parties—but these seem far more trivial than the issue of proportionality.99
Finally, though the efficiency gap claims to be simple and comprehensible—a reduction of the
complexities of gerrymandering to, as Stephanopoulos and McGhee claim, a “single tidy
number”—it is far from that. It both oversimplifies gerrymandering and is far more complex100
than it initially seems to be. Political scientist Moon Duchin wrote, “Gerrymandering is a
fundamentally multidimensional problem, so it is manifestly impossible to convert that into a
single number without a loss of information that is bound to produce many false positives or
false negatives for gerrymandering.”101
At the same time, with the efficiency gap requiring sensitivity testing, hypothetical elections to
replace uncontested races, and the compiling of historic election data to determine the threshold
of unconstitutionality and the degree of hypothetical vote shifts for sensitivity testing, the
calculation of the efficiency gap is anything but simple. Additionally, it fails to be
comprehensive, omitting election results in 98 seats in states with fewer than eight districts.
101 Kean, “The Flaw in America’s ‘Holy Grail’ Against Gerrymandering.”
100 Stephanopoulos and McGhee, “Partisan Gerrymandering,” 831.
99 Sam Kean, “The Flaw in America’s ‘Holy Grail’ Against Gerrymandering,” The Atlantic, January 26, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/01/efficiency-gap-gerrymandering/551492/.
98 Ibid, 1023.
97 Bernstein and Duchin, “A Formula Goes to Court,” 1022.
96 Ibid.
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Part III: The Future of the Efficiency Gap
Despite its many failures, the efficiency gap remains one of the most judicially workable
standards of gerrymandering out there today. It passes, to some extent, Kennedy’s requirements
in LULAC and, for a time, was heralded by political scientists as one of the best hopes to fight
partisan gerrymandering. For a time.
When the efficiency gap was first tested in court, in the Whitford v. Gill ruling, it failed… sort of.
The question of the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering was unanswered: the case was
dismissed on its standing, as the only voter who testified, William Whitford, a Democrat, did not
live in a district that had been heavily gerrymandered against Democrats and could not prove that
they had suffered an “injury in fact.” This technicality allowed the court to kick the can down102
the road for another year.103
Time and again, the Supreme Court has refused the opportunity to definitively put its weight
against partisan gerrymandering. The court did not completely condemn the efficiency gap as a
measure, but it did state its preference of district-level, rather than state-level, measures, as it is
easier to gauge the violation of individual voters’ constitutional rights at the district-level.104
However, the court did leave the door open for the efficiency gap to be used in conjunction with
other gerrymandering measures in future cases.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to rule against partisan gerrymandering could not come at a
more inopportune time: redistricting technology is only becoming more powerful, and diluting
voter power is no longer something that can be accomplished only by master cartographers—on
the contrary, anyone can draw a map from their living room in a matter of hours.
In the 2004 Vieth ruling, the Supreme Court called gerrymandering an “unanswerable question.”
Though the efficiency gap has its (many) flaws, it is something of a workable105
standard—admittedly one that needs a lot of work. And there are other, more effective methods
105 Erica Klarreich, “Gerrymandering Is Illegal, but Only Mathematicians Can Prove It,” Wired, April 16, 2017,
https://www.wired.com/2017/04/gerrymandering-illegal-mathematicians-can-prove/.
104 Mark Rush, “The Efficiency Gap After Gill v. Whitford,” Social Science Quarterly 101, no. 1 (January 2020): 57,
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ssqu.12742.
103 Garrett Epps, “The Supreme Court Would Prefer Not To,” The Atlantic, June 18, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/supreme-court-gill-v-whitford/563075/.
102 Barry C. Burden and David T. Canon, “The Supreme Court decided not to decide Wisconsin’s gerrymandering
case. But here’s why it will be back,” Washington Post, June 19, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/19/the-supreme-court-decided-not-to-decide-wisconsins-gerrymandering-case-but-heres-
why-it-will-be-back/; Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Avoids an Answer on Partisan Gerrymandering,” New York
Times, June 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/supreme-court-wisconsin-maryland-
gerrymander-vote.html.
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to measure gerrymandering available. But the court has dismissed taking action on partisan
gerrymandering apparently because it is too much work to find a functional standard to measure
gerrymandering (Chief Justice John Roberts described the efficiency gap as “sociological
gobbledygook” in Gill v. Whitford, and Justice Neil Gorsuch compared it to his favorite steak
rub). But partisan gerrymandering remains a serious threat to American democracy, despite the106
court, and even if the court dismisses another hundred methods to measure gerrymandering,
voting power will still be diluted unjustly.
In Bandemer v. Davis, the Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional
if extreme enough. Since that ruling in 1986, anti-gerrymandering advocates have been trying to
prove that it is extreme enough, without much success. My response is, in the words of Wendy
Tam Cho, “If you’re never going to declare a partisan gerrymander, what is it that’s
unconstitutional?”107
107 Klarreich, “Gerrymandering Is Illegal.”
106 Epps, “The Supreme Court Would Prefer Not To.”
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3. A Workable Standard
Statistical Outlier Analysis and the Solution to Gerrymandering
Part I: Authoritarian States
Thomas Hofeller, “the master of the modern gerrymander,” died in August 2018, leaving behind
a trove of secret files, emails, studies, spreadsheets, and other documents relating to Republican
gerrymanders and the Trump Administration’s 2019 attempt to add a citizenship question to the
2020 Census. Described in the New York Times as the “Michelangelo of gerrymandering,”108
Hofeller was a top Republican political strategist, who had played a large role in Republican
gerrymanders and political maps across the country—in Arizona, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—in the past decade, and was an
advocate for adding a citizenship question to the Census in order to dilute Democratic
representation by under-counting immigrants.109
The files were discovered by Thomas Hofeller’s estranged daughter, Stephanie Hofeller, who
learned of her father’s death in September 2018 when she randomly searched for her father’s
name online and found an obituary posted a month prior. She drove to her parents’ home in110
Raleigh, North Carolina and visited Kathleen Hofeller, her mother. There Stephanie found a
plastic bag with 18 USB thumb drives and 4 external hard drives, which contained about 75,000
files, including family pictures and the documents pertaining to gerrymandering and the Census
question. According to an NPR article: “Before Stephanie arrived at her parents’ apartment,111
her father’s business partner, Dale Oldham, had removed a laptop and a desktop computer with
Hofeller’s work files, Stephanie said her mother told her. ‘Dale got all the good stuff,’ Stephanie
told attorneys.”112
Stephanie Hofeller got in contact with Common Cause, a nonprofit government watchdog group,
to search for a lawyer to represent her mother, and mentioned the files in passing. At the same
112 Wang, “Deceased GOP Strategist's Daughter.”
111 Wines, “Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives.”
110 Wang, “Deceased GOP Strategist's Daughter.”
109 Michael Wines, “Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives Reveal New Details on the Census Citizenship
Question,” New York Times, May 30, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenship-
question-hofeller.html; Hansi Lo Wang, “Deceased GOP Strategist's Daughter Makes Files Public That Republicans
Wanted Sealed,” NPR, January 5, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/05/785672201/deceased-gop-strategists-
daughter-makes-files-public-that-republicans-wanted-sea.




time, Common Cause had recently filed suit in North Carolina state court against the
Republican-gerrymandered congressional map, and the 75,000-file stache documenting Thomas
Hofeller’s construction of that same congressional map piqued their interest. The law firm
representing Common Cause in the suit, Arnold & Porter (which, coincidentally, was also
representing private plaintiffs pro bono in Federal District Court in Manhattan in the suit against
the potential citizenship question), subpoenaed the Hofeller files.113
Geographic Strategies, Thomas Hofeller’s company, attempted to prevent the publication of the
Hofeller files, which Stephanie made available online in January 2020, because Geographic
Strategies argues that the files contain “trade secrets.” These challenges, as well as the fear of114
the files being destroyed, prompted Stephanie to send copies of the files to the New York Times,
the New Yorker, and other news organizations, and many other publications have since reported
on them.
One irony revealed in the Hofeller files is that Hofeller emphasized discretion and email security
in a presentation for legislators and congressional map–drawers, saying “emails are the tool of
the devil” and “treat every statement and document as if it was going to appear on the FRONT
PAGE of your local newspaper.” Of course, Hofeller’s files have now appeared in the New York
Times and the New Yorker—hardly discrete platforms for Republican gerrymandering secrets.
In 2015, the files reveal, Hofeller was hired by the Washington Free Beacon, a conservative
publication, to conduct a study of the potential impact of drawing legislative and congressional
maps based on voting-age population, rather than total population.115
As written by David Daley in the New Yorker: “Mr. Hofeller’s exhaustive analysis of Texas state
legislative districts concluded that such maps ‘would be advantageous to Republicans and
non-Hispanic whites,’ and would dilute the political power of the state’s Hispanics. The reason,
he wrote, was that the maps would exclude traditionally Democratic Hispanics and their
children from the population count. That would force Democratic districts to expand to meet the
Constitution’s one person, one vote requirement. In turn, that would translate into fewer districts
in traditionally Democratic areas, and a new opportunity for Republican mapmakers to create
even stronger gerrymanders. The strategy carried a fatal flaw, however: the detailed citizenship
data that was needed to draw the maps did not exist.”i116
116 Ibid.
115 Daley, “The Secret Files.”
114 Wang, “Deceased GOP Strategist's Daughter.”
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Hanson 33
The solution, Hofeller argued, was a citizenship question in the 2020 Census. In 2016, Hofeller
and Dale Oldham, his business partner who took Hofeller’s laptop and desktop after his death,
got in contact with then-president-elect Trump’s transition team and Mark Neuman, who was
managing the Census transition and became an advisor to Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross.117
In November 2019, the House Oversight and Reform Committee released text messages and
emails between Neuman, Hoffeler, and Oldham revealing that the three were designing the
language of a Census citizenship question with the goal of undercounting immigrants and
diluting Democratic voting power in August 2017. Included in the released documents was a
letter from the Justice Department to the Census Bureau that stated the question was necessary to
guarantee “compliance with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act and its application in
legislative redistricting.” As the addition of a citizenship question would likely undercount118
minority groups, this reasoning is, at best, malicious.
In another email to Hofeller, Neuman dismisses the idea of using the American Community
Service (ACS) data as a source for voting-age population statistics. The ACS is a standard annual
Census survey; I used it for voting-age population in my hypothetical election simulations to
calculate efficiency gaps and found it completely suitable—but I digress.
The Hofeller files were used in the suit against the Census citizenship question as proof of
partisan intent behind the question and evidence that there is no other substantive argument to
add the question other than helping Republicans at the ballot box.
In May 2019, a Justice Department spokesman stated that the 2015 Hofeller study “played no
role in the Department’s December 2017 request to reinstate a citizenship question to the 2020
decennial census.” That “reinstating” refers to the last time a census citizenship question was119
considered—in 1950. Additionally, the Justice Department’s argument that Hofeller had no120
role in the formulation of the census question is dead wrong. From the New York Times: “In their
court filings… lawyers for the plaintiffs said that ‘many striking similarities’ between Mr.
Hofeller’s study and the department’s request for a citizenship question indicated that the study
was an important source document for the Justice Department’s request.” To top off the121
blatant partisanship in the drive to add the citizenship question, the New York Times, again,
121 Wines, “Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives.”
120 Bahrampour, “New evidence shows contact.”
119 Tara Bahrampour and Robert Barnes, “Despite Trump administration denials, new evidence suggests census
citizenship question was crafted to benefit white Republicans,” Washington Post, May 30, 2019,
https://wapo.st/36ElBaP.
118 Ibid.
117 Tara Bahrampour, “New evidence shows contact between Trump official and Republican redistricting expert over
census citizenship question,” Washington Post, November 12, 2019, https://wapo.st/33HUWZ0.
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wrote: “The filing also says flatly that [assistant attorney general for civil rights] Mr. Gore and
Mr. Neuman ‘falsely testified’ under oath about the Justice Department’s actions on the
citizenship question.”122
The Supreme Court, in Department of Commerce v. New York, did not buy the Commerce
Department’s argument that the question was necessary to fulfill requirements established in the
Voting Rights Act and remanded the case to the district court. The Trump Administration later123
dropped the question.
The Hofeller files also revealed Thomas Hofeller’s role in the 2016 North Carolina Republican
gerrymander. The gerrymander was one of the worst in the nation, if not in American history (the
map was struck down last year as a violation of the state constitution). The 2016 map was a
partisan gerrymander introduced by the Republican-controlled legislature as a replacement for
the 2011 Republican-drawn map, as that map had been struck down as an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander. The 2016 map was, to put it mildly, extreme: the congressional delegation in 2018
was comprised of 3 Democrats and 10 Republicans, even though Democrats received a majority
of votes cast in House elections.124
In order to draw the incredibly effective gerrymander, Thomas Hofeller compiled a database of
voter registration, gender, race, likely partisan lean, and addresses (down to the residence hall) of
23,100 North Carolina college students, many attending historically black colleges and
universities like North Carolina A&T State University. According to the New Yorker: “Some
spreadsheets have more than fifty different fields with precise racial, gender, and geographic
details on thousands of college voters.”125
This intricate data collection paired well with North Carolina’s 2013 voter-I.D. law, which
reduced the number of eligible voter-I.D.s, especially hindering ballot access for minority groups
and students, limited early voting, and ended same-day voter registration. Hofeller was involved
in the defense of the voter-I.D. law when the North Carolina N.A.A.C.P. challenged it in court.
The result of this was described, again, in the New Yorker: “Perhaps one of the clearest and
ugliest gerrymanders in North Carolina—or in the entire nation—is the congressional-district
line that cuts in half the nation’s largest historically black college, North Carolina A&T State
University, in Greensboro. The district line divided this majority minority campus—and the
city—so precisely that it all but guarantees it will be represented in Congress by two Republicans
125 Daley, “The Secret Files.”
124 “U.S. House Election Results 2018,” New York Times.




for years to come.” All of Hofeller’s gerrymandering and Census work was bankrolled by the126
Republican Party with the explicit intent to disenfranchise Democratic voters.
.  .  .
The problem of rampant partisan gerrymandering in North Carolina is furthered by other
authoritarian tendencies in the state’s government. In 2016, Democrat Roy Cooper edged out
incumbent Republican Pat McCrory in the North Carolina gubernatorial election, defeating
McCrory by about 0.2% of the statewide vote. However, in Cooper’s lame duck period, the127
North Carolina legislature (which was—and is—Republican-controlled and
Republican-gerrymandered) convened for a special legislative session to strip powers from the
governor before he took office. According to Ratf**ked by David Daley, the legislature, among
other changes to the state constitution, “...reworked those county election boards so that both
parties shared control. Except they wouldn’t actually share power. Democrats would govern them
in odd years, Republicans in even ones. Statewide elections, of course, are only held in even
years.”128
The 2016 North Carolina legislative coup foreshadowed similar events in Wisconsin and
Michigan in 2018, when Democrats Tony Evers and Gretchen Whitmer, respectively, defeated
incumbent Republican Governors. In both states, the Republican legislature convened for a129
special session and again took power from the governors’ offices before the elected Democrats
assumed power. Two of those states—North Carolina and Michigan—have an efficiency gap130
over the proposed 2-congressional seat threshold of unconstitutionality in favor of
Republicans—3.52 and 2.29, respectively—and the third state—Wisconsin—has an efficiency
gap of 1.42 in favor of Republicans, high enough, in my opinion, to still be considered a
gerrymander.
On top of the extreme partisan gerrymandering and legislative coup-ing that has taken place in
North Carolina in the past five years, there have also been accounts of election fraud, the most
notable being in the 2018 congressional election in North Carolina’s 9th district. There,
according to an NPR article, Republican political operative Leslie McCrae Dowless was “...the
130 Russell Berman, “The Republicans’ Midwest ‘Power Grab,’” The Atlantic, December 4, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/gop-power-grab-wisconsin-and-michigan/577246/; Jake
Johnson, “‘Stand Up, Fight Back!’” Common Dreams, December 12, 2018, https://www.commondreams.org
/news/2018/12/12/stand-fight-back-protestors-storm-capitol-michigan-gop-moves-ahead-lame-duck-coup.
129 “Governor Election Results 2018,” New York Times, May 15, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018
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alleged ringleader in a scheme instructing his co-conspirators to sign certifications that falsely
stated they had seen a voter vote by absentee ballot, and improperly mailing in absentee ballots
for someone who had not mailed it themselves.”131
All of these gross violations of North Carolinians voting rights and authoritarian undermining of
election process point to the fact that, as the Electoral Integrity Project found, North Carolina is
“no longer considered to be a fully functioning democracy.” The Electoral Integrity Project is132
a Harvard University research project studying the integrity and responsiveness of governments
around the world. University of North Carolina professor Andrew Reynolds used the Electoral
Integrity Project’s criteria to measure how democratic and representative the North Carolina
government was. According to RatF**ked, North Carolina “earned a failing grade with an
overall electoral-integrity score of 58 out of 100 for 2016. That score, he wrote, ‘places us
alongside authoritarian states and pseudo-democracies like Cuba, Indonesia, and Sierra Leone.’
[...] When the professor measured the integrity of the district boundaries, he found something he
almost could not believe: North Carolina earned a 7 out of 100. That’s not only the worst
rigged-district ranking for any state in the country, but the ‘worst entity in the world ever
analyzed by the Electoral Integrity Project.’”133
.  .  .
So why did I just spend 1,980 words discussing the Hofeller files and democracy—or the lack
thereof—in North Carolina? Well, first, gerrymandering is part of a much larger crisis of
democracy in America; to improve our election system, we need to eliminate gerrymandering as
well as make the ballot box more accessible in a number of ways including expanding mail-in
voting, ending voter-I.D. laws, and implementing automatic voter registration, among others.
Second, partisan gerrymandering harms people. For voters in North Carolina, there is little
incentive to cast a ballot, as the district lines predetermine election victors. That
mis-representation harms voters by not reflecting their actual policy preferences. And third, the
problem of partisan gerrymandering is really bad, North Carolina probably being the most
authoritarian, anti-democratic state in the union.
Having described the dire extent of the gerrymandering problem in North Carolina, I want to turn
away from that state for the time being, and look at another potential solution for the Supreme
133 Daley, Rat F**ked, 226.
132 Carol Anderson, One Person, No Vote (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), 97.
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Court’s request for a “workable standard” that has played a large role in recent judicial
deliberations on the North Carolina congressional map—statistical outlier analysis.
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Part II: Random Walks
In part 2, I discussed the efficiency gap—how it functions, its benefits and drawbacks, and its
role in gerrymandering litigation going forward. In Gill v. Whitford, the efficiency gap failed to
compel the court to rule on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering, and the measure was
relegated to a secondary role in the future, only acting as a small piece of evidence in a larger set
of measures. Statistical outlier analysis took the efficiency gap’s place in Rucho v. Common
Cause and other state constitution suits. The method, in my opinion, is a far better measure of
gerrymandering, and has greater potential to act as a “workable standard” in court.
Statistical outlier analysis is superior to the efficiency gap in its complexity; while the efficiency
gap advertises itself as a “single tidy number,” statistical outlier analysis recognizes the
fundamental intricacy of voting and, by extension, democracy. Furthermore, the134
one-dimensionality of the efficiency gap is its undoing in valuing competitiveness, reflecting the
long-term stability of gerrymandered plans, disregarding gerrymandering in small-congressional
district states, conflating winning and losing wasted votes, and idealizing 75-25 district and state
vote splits.
Indeed, no gerrymandering measure can perfectly capture the nuance of the democratic voting
process. As mathematician Moon Duchin said in an interview with Quanta Magazine this year,
“We fundamentally don’t know how to and should not try to turn the whole complicated picture
of representative democracy and its ideals into an objective function… no objective function
really captures the complexity of what we’re trying to do when we vote.” What this means for135
gerrymandering measurement is, as Jonathan Mattingly and Christy Vaughn wrote in a study
entitled Redistricting and the Will of the People, “The ‘will of the people’ is not a single election
outcome but rather a distribution of possible outcomes.”136
The essential question that statistical outlier analysis seeks to answer is: What would a
congressional district map look like if partisanship had not had a role in the drawing of district
lines? To this end, the method simulates tens of thousands, million, even billions of
congressional maps, modeling for state-determined redistricting criteria and controlling for
Supreme Court–mandated population equality, and produces a curve describing the probability of
state maps to produce different partisan outcomes. This is then compared to the map under
scrutiny to determine if it is a statistical outlier and is therefore a partisan gerrymander.
136 Jonathan C. Mattingly and Christy Vaughn, “Redistricting and the Will of the People,” arXiv (October 29, 2014):
1, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1410.8796.pdf.
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In state redistricting, the most basic unit to construct a map is the precinct, though this can be
further broken down with more intricate, detailed data. In my home state of Colorado, there are
currently 3,219 precincts. In the 2016 presidential election, there were 170,850 precincts in the
entire United States. Precincts can then be divided into trillions and trillions of different137
possible maps; mathematician Moon Duchin wrote in an article for Scientific American, “By the
time you get to a grid of nine-by-nine, there are more than 700 trillion solutions for
equinumerous rook partitions, and even a high-performance computer needs a week to count
them all.” Incredibly, mathematicians have yet to calculate the number of possible maps in a138
simple six-by-six grid split into two districts where the districts do not have to be equal-sized, as
it would take a computer over a week to calculate the number of possible maps. When
approaching the number of precincts in a state, Duchin said in an interview, “we’re probably
looking at the google range, by which I mean 10 to the 100.” This far exceeds the number of139
atoms in the universe, which is between 1078 and 1082 (Mattingly & Vaughn, 11). To state the
obvious, this far exceeds Justice Alito’s suspicion that, in drawing the lines, there’s “maybe
dozens, maybe hundred, maybe even thousands of ways.”140
There are so many possible plans that it would be near-impossible to calculate all the possible
maps in a state, so political scientists and mathematicians use Markov Chain Monte Carlo, which
is a method to take a random sampling of maps that is representative of the universe of possible
maps—this universe of possible maps is called an ensemble of maps. Markov Chain Monte141
Carlo is essentially a random walk through a map; imagine you’re standing at one point on the
edge of a precinct and walk along the edge of the precinct until another precinct’s border
intersects the edge you’re walking along. You then have a choice to continue along your current
path to the next vertex or to turn and walk along the edge of the intersecting precinct. Markov
Chain Monte Carlo is a mathematical way to simulate this decision-making on a much larger
scale, finding a sampling of the ensemble of maps.142
Rather than producing a completely random ensemble of maps, however, mathematicians input
criteria to influence the probabilities of following different precinct edges and turning—or not
turning—at intersections. There are a few federally mandated criteria for drawing district lines143
including population equality between districts (for example, you cannot have one district with a
143 Duchin, “Gerrymandering Metrics,” 4.
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population of 100,000 and another with a population of 150,000), district contiguity, and there
must be, to some extent, minority opportunity to be elected and represented (as mandated by the
Voting Rights Act of 1965). Other redistricting criteria are set by state laws and constitutions,144
such as Iowa’s emphasis on keeping counties together and Arizona’s mandate to prioritize
creating competitive districts, and these can also be worked into the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
calculation.145
Once political scientists and mathematicians are satisfied with the number of maps they have
simulated (for example, in Rucho v. Common Cause, the plaintiffs simulated 24,518 maps), they
can then lay them out on a curve revealing the probability of maps following state and federal
redistricting criteria to produce different partisan outcomes using real-world votes. The map146
under scrutiny is then compared to the curve of probable maps to determine if it is a statistical
outlier. For example, if the average Democratic seats in an ensemble of maps for a state is 10,
and in 90% of simulations, Democrats received between 7 and 12 seats, but under the current
maps Democrats only receive 4 seats, the map is probably an outlier and, therein, a Republican
gerrymander.
There is no set threshold for outliers to be declared gerrymanders, but this is not as great a
detractor for using the method as it may appear. Fundamentally, statistical outlier analysis is
descriptive of maps relative to the most probable, nonpartisan map rather than it being
prescriptive of maps being gerrymanders. No single measure can perfectly capture the
complexities of voting or gerrymandering, but the statistical outlier method effectively indicates
when partisan intent may have played a role in the drawing of a map. The method shows when
there is something wrong with a map that cannot simply be explained away as a result of state
political geography or attempting to succeed in state or federal criteria, as geography and criteria
are both built into the Markov Chain Monte Carlo.
.  .  .
Statistical outlier analysis has been used in gerrymandering litigation in, most recently, League of
Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which was the successful
challenge to the Republican-gerrymandered Pennsylvania congressional map ruled illegal under
the state constitution. Additionally, statistical outlier analysis was used by plaintiffs in Rucho v.
Common Cause, the unsuccessful suit against the Republican-gerrymandered North Carolina
congressional map, which was brought before the Supreme Court in 2018—Rucho challenged
the same map that Thomas Hofeller helped draw.
146 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 20 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
145 Duchin, “Gerrymandering Metrics,” 5.
144 Strogatz, “Moon Duchin on Fair Voting.”
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In League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, the Republican legislature-drawn congressional
map was thrown out by the state supreme court after a statistical outlier analysis by
mathematician Jowei Chen. According to a New York Times article, “In the view of the majority
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, ‘perhaps the most compelling evidence’ that Republicans
sacrificed traditional redistricting criteria for partisan gain was a political scientist’s [Jowei
Chen’s] simulation of 500 possible congressional maps.”147
After the old map was discarded by the court, both the legislature and Democratic Governor Tom
Wolf proposed replacement maps. Mathematician Moon Duchin ran a statistical outlier analysis
of the new plans for the governor and found that “there is less than a 0.1% chance that the
Turzai-Scarnati plan [the plan drawn by the Republican-controlled legislature] was drawn in a
non-partisan way.” Additionally, the report found that “the GOV [governor’s] plan does not148
meet even the looser standard for statistical significance, and in fact when it exhibits any
partisan skew, it is not skewed in the Democratic-favoring direction.”149
The political geography of Pennsylvania implicitly favors Republicans because Democrats are
highly concentrated in large urban centers in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and many other
Democrats live in small and medium-sized cities that are surrounded by heavily-Republican rural
areas such as State College, Erie, York, and Lancaster. It is difficult for these cities to be
represented by a Democrat, even if the district lines are drawn without partisan intent. Duchin’s
statistical outlier analysis reflects this: “The full range of possibilities I encountered in trillions
of trials against recent [state] Senate vote geography was 4 to 10 seats for Democrats [out of
18], but the 5-seat outcome is relatively rare and the 4-seat outcome is vanishingly rare.”150
In Duchin’s analysis, she used two different methods of Markov Chain Monte Carlo: a simple
and a weighted random walk. The simple random walk took into account federally mandated151
redistricting requirements, such as contiguity and population equality, but ignored normative
state and federal criteria, such as compactness and minimizing county splits (county splitting is
when a county is split into multiple districts even though its population is large enough to
minimize splitting). The weighted random walk, on the other hand, did take into account




148 Moon Duchin, “Outlier analysis for Pennsylvania congressional redistricting,” (February 2018): 1,
https://mggg.org/uploads/md-report.pdf.
147 Nate Cohn, “Hundreds of Simulated Maps Show How Well Democrats Fared in Pennsylvania,” New York Times,
February 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/upshot/democrats-did-better-than-on-hundreds
-of-simulated-pennsylvania-maps.html.
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Duchin also made maintaining communities of interest a priority in her weighted random walk,
treating her defined “geoclusters” (cities, neighborhoods, and geographic areas) similar to
counties, in that the algorithm probabilistically prefers to take random walks which do not split
communities of interest. By doing so, Duchin argues that minority opportunity is protected as152
minority-majority communities of interest are less likely to be split.
Finally, Duchin measured the resulting probability curves and was able to compare her produced
maps to the proposed and current maps using two traditional gerrymandering measures:
mean-median difference (which is a form of partisan bias measure) and the efficiency gap. She
found the legislature’s proposed replacement map to be a gerrymander, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court threw out the Republican map again and drew their own map. The new map was
not a gerrymander, and in the 2018 midterm elections, Democrats received 9 of the state’s 18
seats, roughly mirroring their 53.9% statewide vote share.
The new, court-drawn map, however, is very favorable to Democrats: under the new map,
Democrats received more congressional seats than they would have under any of the 500
randomly drawn maps in Chen’s analysis used in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania.153
That being said, the new map is not a statistical outlier, and satisfies traditional, nonpartisan
redistricting criteria. According to an Upshot analysis: “The new Pennsylvania map… meets
every standard nonpartisan criteria. It’s compact, minimizes county or municipal splits and
preserves communities of interest. But it consistently makes subtle choices that suggest that
partisan balance may have been an important consideration.” The decision to roughly match154
proportionality is significant in that it is a unique choice among states, but it is not a reflection on
the statistical outlier method in itself, the method generally recommending a more favorable map
for Republicans. Regardless, the new map still slightly favors Republicans.
.  .  .
Statistical outlier analyses of North Carolina, similar to that of Pennsylvania, reveal extreme
Republican gerrymanders. In 2014, mathematicians Jonathan Mattingly and Christy Vaughn
published one such analysis, revealing that, in a sampling of 100 maps in their ensemble, in no
map did Democrats receive 4 or less of North Carolina’s 13 congressional seats, and Democrats
154 Nate Cohn, Matthew Bloch, and Kevin Quealy, “The New Pennsylvania Congressional Map, District by
District,” New York Times, February 19, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/19/upshot/
pennsylvania-new-house-districts-gerrymandering.html.
153 Cohn, “Hundreds of Simulated Maps.”
152 Ibid, 10.
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averaged 7.6 Democratic seats. At the time, Democrats held only 3 congressional seats in the155
state.156
It should be noted that North Carolina’s congressional map was changed in 2016 after it was
ruled an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. However, Mattingly & Vaughn’s findings hold true
with the redrawn map because, although the new map visually looked a lot better, it produced
similar results and remained heavily Republican-gerrymandered.
In the study, two different methods were used to produce ensembles of maps: “Long Period” and
“Short Period.” The Short Period method produced more maps, but was less restricted by the
inputted state and federal redistricting criteria, while the Long Period was more precise but had a
narrower ensemble. The two methods had similar results, determining that a random157
nonpartisan map drawn to some extent within the confines of state and federal criteria would
produce approximately 7 Democratic seats, with the Long Period method giving Democrats
slightly more seats than the Short Period method.158
158 Ibid, 5.
157 Mattingly and Vaughn, “Redistricting and the Will of the People,” 4.
156 “House Election Results 2014,” New York Times, December 17, 2014,
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2014/results/house.
155 Mattingly and Vaughn, “Redistricting and the Will of the People,” 3.
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Part III: A Workable Standard
The greatest advantage of statistical outlier analysis over the efficiency gap, partisan bias, and
other gerrymandering measures is that it clearly does not use proportionality as a baseline.
Instead, rather than comparing a map’s current partisan distribution to a proportional seat
allocation, statistical outlier analysis reveals what a map would look like had there been no
partisan intent in the redistricting process.
In Rucho v. Common Cause in 2018, Jowei Chen, who had run a simulation for League of
Women Voters of Pennsylvania, did a statistical outlier analysis of North Carolina’s congressional
map, and that formed the core of the plaintiffs allegations that the Republican-controlled
legislature had committed a partisan gerrymander. Justice Kagan remarked on the fact that
statistical outlier analysis did not rely on proportionality in its determination of gerrymanders in
oral arguments for Rucho: “What's quite interesting about the statistical analysis in this case is
that quite a lot of it does not run off a proportional representation benchmark. In other words, all
the computer simulations, all the 25,000 maps… really do take the political geography of the
state as a given. So… if Democrats are clustered and Republicans aren't, that's in the program.
And all the other redistricting requirements or preferences, like contiguity, like following natural
boundaries, that's all in the program. So… the benchmark is not proportional representation.
The benchmark is the natural political geography of the state, plus all the districting criteria,
except for partisanship. And if you run those maps, right, what did you get? You got 24,000 maps
and this—and 99 percent of them, 99 plus percent of them, were on one side of the map that was
picked here.”159
Another advantage of statistical outlier analysis is that it gives legislatures some (limited) wiggle
room in the redistricting process, allowing the drawing of a range of maps with a range of
outcomes. This preserves the Constitutionally described role of the legislative branch and state
governments in the drawing of district lines, while giving the judicial branch a much-needed role
in overseeing the legislative branch in the redistricting process.
Additionally, statistical outlier analysis does not require any kind of hypothetical elections, a
problem inherent to both partisan bias and the efficiency gap. All the data is sourced from
real-world elections, and in the case of uncontested races, party registration and prior election
data can be used in the affected precincts. Ultimately, the confluence of the benefits of statistical
outlier analysis makes it, as Justice Breyer put it in Rucho oral arguments, “absolutely a
workable standard.”160
160 Ibid, Breyer, J., 21:17.
159 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (Kagan, J., oral arguments, 22:43).
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4. The People Are Sovereign
Rucho v. Common Cause and the Future of Gerrymandering
Part I: Statistical Outlier Analysis Goes to Court
In 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed Gill on standing, finding that the grounds on which the
plaintiff’s case were built were insufficient in proving that they had suffered an “injury in fact.”
In Gill, the plaintiffs challenged the 2011 Republican-gerrymandered Wisconsin state161
legislative map. The plaintiff, William Whitford, primarily used the “one person, one vote”
principle to build his case—one person, one vote was established in the 1960s in Baker v. Carr,
Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims. In Gill v. Whitford, the plaintiffs argued that one
person, one vote had been violated by the Republican gerrymander because it constituted a form
of vote dilution, making votes for Republicans more meaningful than votes cast for Democratic
candidates. However, as Justice Elena Kagan wrote in a concurrence, “To have standing to bring
a partisan gerrymandering claim based on vote dilution, then, a plaintiff must prove that the
value of her own vote has been ‘contract[ed].’ Wesberry, 376 U. S., at 7. And that entails
showing, as the Court holds, that she lives in a district that has been either packed or cracked.”
162
Whitford, however, did not live in a district that was proved to have been either packed or
cracked, and, in fact, Whitford’s district, Wisconsin’s 76th Assembly District, regularly produced
Democratic victories with more than 80% of the vote. Additionally, the “ideal” replacement map
proposed by the plaintiffs produced similar results in Whitford’s district: a Democratic vote share
of about 82%. The plaintiffs argument was then, as William Whitford said, “[t]he only practical
way to accomplish my policy objectives is to get a majority of Democrats in the Assembly and
the Senate ideally in order to get the legislative product I prefer.”163
This argument is problematic, as plaintiffs must prove that an individual’s constitutional rights
were violated before the Supreme Court, and Whitford failed to do so; the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously that the plaintiffs did not have standing.
In her Gill concurrence, however, Justice Kagan outlined a path forward for partisan
gerrymandering litigation. She proposed that rather than building cases on one person, one vote
and the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs should use freedom of association under the First
163 Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ___, 5 (2018) (Robert, J.).
162 Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ___, 4 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
161 Burden and Canon, “The Supreme Court decided not to decide.”
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Amendment. Established by a series of Supreme Court cases in the 1950s and 1960s regarding164
southern states’ efforts to limit N.A.A.C.P. membership, freedom of association is the right to
associate oneself with social, political, and religious groups as a form of freedom of speech,
without government limiting the ability of citizens to associate. The advantage of using165
freedom of association in partisan gerrymandering litigation is that it does not rely on individual
voters’ rights to the extent that one person, one vote does; instead, groups of citizens from across
states can file suit together, as associations. This allows plaintiffs to more freely use statewide
gerrymandering metrics, rather than being confined to district-by-district measures that are less
effective and fewer and farther between.166
Following Gill, District Courts in both Lamone v. Benisek and Rucho v. Common Cause found
partisan gerrymandering justiciable under the First Amendment, finding the plaintiffs’ freedom
of association argument persuasive. In addition to freedom of association, plaintiffs claimed167
that partisan gerrymandering violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Elections Clause, and Article I, §2, of the Constitution.168
In the first of the 2019 Supreme Court cases, Lamone v. Benisek, three Republican voters in
Maryland alleged that the state’s 2011 congressional map was an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. The map had been drawn by the Democratic-controlled state legislature and
then-Democratic governor Martin O’Malley. O’Malley formed a Redistricting Advisory169
Committee led by Congressman Steny Hoyer, who has described himself as a “serial
gerrymanderer.” Hoyer’s goal was to increase Democrats’ share of the Maryland170
congressional delegation from 6 seats to 7, out of a total of 8, as well as to draw a map that
Maryland’s congressional delegation would approve of (essentially meaning that Hoyer had to
protect all incumbent Democratic congressmen). Hoyer and Eric Hawkins, a mapmaker hired by
the Democrats, decided to attempt to flip Maryland’s Sixth District, which had been represented
by a Republican for nearly two decades. Hawkins redrew the Sixth District so that the number171
of registered Republicans in the district was decreased by 66,000 and the number of Democrats
increased by 24,000, making it a safe Democratic district. After the map was drawn by172
Hawkins using many of the same methods employed by Thomas Hofeller in North Carolina, the
172 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 6 (2019)  (Kagan,J., dissenting).
171 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ , 5 (2019) (Robert, J.); Rucho v. Common Cause, No.
18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 5 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
170 Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. ____ (2018).
169 Ibid, 5.
168 Ibid, 1.
167 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 25 (2019) (Robert, J.).
166 Burden and Canon, “The Supreme Court decided not to decide.”
165 “Right of Association,” Legal Information Institute, accessed December 3, 2020,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/right-of-association.
164 Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
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map was adopted on party-line votes in both the Redistricting Advisory Committee and the
General Assembly.173
In Justice Kagan’s dissent in Rucho v. Common Cause (Lamone and Rucho were ruled on jointly
by the Supreme Court), she wrote: “Maryland’s Democrats proved no less successful than North
Carolina’s Republicans in devising a voter-proof map. In the four elections that followed (from
2012 through 2018), Democrats have never received more than 65% of the statewide
congressional vote. Yet in each of those elections, Democrats have won (you guessed it) 7 of 8
House seats—including the once-reliably-Republican Sixth District.”174
The second 2019 Supreme Court case, Rucho v. Common Cause, was a suit brought against
then-Republican Senator Bob Rucho, who was the chairman of the North Carolina Senate
Redistricting Committee, by Common Cause, a nonpartisan government reform group, as well as
the League of Women Voters of North Carolina. The two reform groups filed separate suits
against Rucho in 2016, when the congressional map was redrawn, but their cases were
consolidated in District Court.
In 2016, the North Carolina congressional map was ruled an unconstitutional racial gerrymander
by the Supreme Court in Cooper v. Harris, and the state legislature was ordered to redraw the
map. The Republican-controlled legislature proposed a replacement map that was drawn in175
large part by Thomas Hofeller, his business associate Dale Oldham, and their company,
Geographic Strategies. Hofeller’s map was presented to the Joint Redistricting Committee, which
was chaired by Rucho, by Republican Representative David Lewis in an extra session of the
General Assembly. The Joint Redistricting Committee was comprised of both Democratic and176
Republican senators and representatives, though Republicans held a large majority of seats on
the committee.
Addressing Rucho, Lewis said, “As we are allowed to consider political data in the drawing of
the maps, I would propose that to the extent possible, the map drawers create a map which is
perhaps likely to elect 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats. I acknowledge freely that this would be
a political gerrymander, which is not against the law.”177
Later, Senator Floyd McKissick, a Democrat and the Deputy Minority Leader, questioned
Hofeller’s map’s proposed partisan seat allocation—10 Republicans and 3 Democrats—given the
177 Ibid, Rep. Lewis, JA 308.
176 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), Joint Appendix Volume II, JA 308, https://www.
supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-422/87664/20190208135437079_18-422%20JA%20Vol%202.pdf.




fact that statewide party registration was roughly equal between Democrats and Republicans.178
McKissick received a frank and telling answer from Lewis: “I propose that we draw the maps to
give a partisan advantage to 10 Republicans and 3 Democrats because I do not believe it’s
possible to draw a map with 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats.” Again, the map passed out of179
the Joint Redistricting Committee along party lines, as it did when the full General Assembly
voted on it.
Rucho v. Common Cause was first decided by a three-judge panel in the District Court of the
Middle District of North Carolina, which ruled 2–1 in Common Cause’s favor. This was then
appealed to the Supreme Court by the defendant. However, when Rucho v. Common Cause first
reached the Supreme Court in 2018 in conjunction with Lamone v. Benisek, the Supreme Court
waited to rule until they decided Gill v. Whitford. Both Rucho and Lamone were then vacated and
remanded by the Court. The two cases clawed their way back up to the Supreme Court a year180
later, in 2019, and were consolidated and ruled on jointly that year.
Learning from Gill v. Whitford, plaintiffs in Rucho and Lamone followed Kagan’s instructions
outlined in her Gill dissent, arguing their case on First Amendment grounds. Additionally, the181
Rucho plaintiffs brought a new mathematic tool to definitively prove the presence of partisan
gerrymanders: statistical outlier analysis. Common Cause primarily used two analyses to prove
their case: one from University of Michigan professor Jowei Chen and one from Duke University
professor Jonathan Mattingly.
Mattingly described the process of determining if the Republican legislature-drawn map was, in
fact, an outlier and, therefore, a gerrymander in lower court in October 2017: “...we generated a
large number, over 24,000 maps, that adhered to [...] the nonpartisan redistricting criteria laid
out in House Bill 92. Then we took each of those maps, and we took the actual vote count from
the 2012 or the 2016 elections, and we saw what outcome that map would produce, and then we
tabulated all of those statistics, the outcomes of each [...] of those elections, as well as the
partisan makeup of each of the districts, and then we used that to provide a background against
which we could evaluate the Judges maps or the 2012 maps or the 2016 maps.”182
Mattingly’s study, along with Chen’s, clearly described Hofeller’s and the Republicans’
congressional map as an extreme partisan gerrymander, as described in the Brief for Common
182 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), Joint Appendix Volume II, JA 364–365.
181 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 1 (2019) (Roberts, J.).
180 Adam Liptak and Alan Blinder, “Supreme Court Temporarily Blocks North Carolina Gerrymandering Ruling,”
New York Times, January 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/politics/supreme-court-north-
carolina-gerrymandering.html.
179 Ibid, Rep. Lewis, JA 310.
178 Ibid, Sen. McKissick, JA 310.
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Cause Appellees: “Dr. Chen generated 3,000 alternative maps, under which the composition of
North Carolina’s delegation formed a bell curve [...], mostly split 7–6 or 6–7… None of the
3,000 maps yielded a Republican advantage as great as the 10–3 split of the 2016 Plan… Dr.
Mattingly, meanwhile, generated over 24,000 alternative maps using traditional nonpartisan
criteria. Fewer than 0.7% of them resulted in a Republican advantage as lopsided as 10–3. Thus,
on a statewide basis, the 2016 Plan was literally off the charts—an ‘extreme statistical outlier’
that could not be explained by reference to traditional districting criteria.”183
However, despite the improvement in gerrymandering measures between Gill and Rucho, one
variable proved to be salient in the ruling: the retirement of Justice Anthony Kennedy in 2018.184
Before Rucho, Kennedy had indicated an openness to ruling on partisan gerrymandering in Vieth
v. Jubelirer and LULAC v. Perry in the 2000s if the plaintiff presented their case with a better
measure of gerrymandering than partisan bias. For a number of reasons, many reform groups and
plaintiffs turned to the efficiency gap, but, as Gill v. Whitford was dismissed on standing, Justice
Kennedy never definitively weighed in on the efficiency gap or the constitutionality of partisan
gerrymandering. Justice Kennedy stepped down in the interlude between Gill and Rucho and
President Trump appointed Justice Brett Kavanaugh to Kennedy’s seat in the Court. Setting aside
the controversy surrounding Justice Kavanaugh’s appointment, Kavanaugh has since proven
himself to be an obstacle, rather than an ally, to redistricting reform, and plaintiffs in Rucho and
Lamone were forced to focus instead on convincing Chief Justice John Roberts to act as the
swing vote on gerrymandering litigation. Roberts has not performed this role.
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court decided that both the plaintiff’s constitutional
argument and statistical outlier analysis as a measure of gerrymandering were insufficient to
declare partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional; in fact, the majority opinion determined the
issue to be nonjusticiable, meaning that federal courts could not rule on gerrymandering—now
and forever (or at least until a future Supreme Court ruling overturns Rucho).
The consequences of the Rucho ruling cannot be understated. In an NPR interview, Loyola Law
School professor Justin Levitt said, “We are in Mad Max territory now; there are no rules. I
think you’ll see more legislators in more states taking up the mantle of extreme partisan
aggression against people who disagree with them.” Additionally, Rucho has already been185
used as precedent in a number of cases which also threaten the integrity of our democracy. For
example, in April of this year, as the first wave of the Coronavirus pandemic was forcing many
185 Ibid.
184 Nina Totenberg, Domenico Montanaro, and Miles Parks, “Supreme Court Rules Partisan Gerrymandering Is
Beyond The Reach Of Federal Courts,” NPR, June 27, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/06/27/731847977/supreme
-court-rules-partisan-gerrymandering-is-beyond-the-reach-of-federal-court.
183 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), Brief for Common Cause Appellees, 13–14.
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states to issue stay-at-home orders, the Democratic Party attempted to delay, through a
gubernatorial executive order, Wisconsin’s primary election so that voters would not have to
stand in line waiting to cast ballots, risking spreading the virus. However, the Republican Party186
challenged this delay, and in Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee,
the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 (with the conservative wing forming the majority) that the election
would proceed regardless of the pandemic. The legal precedent in the ruling was, in large part,187
Rucho, as that case established a much-reduced role for the judicial branch in overseeing
elections, regardless of the role of partisanship in the voting process. The fight over the 2020
Wisconsin primary election is but a preview of what could come with Rucho on the books.
187 Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, “What’s behind the fight over Wisconsin’s primary? The
Supreme Court’s gerrymandering ruling,” Washington Post, April 21, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/2020/04/21/republicans-democrats-fought-over-holding-wisconsins-election-thats-because-supreme-court-w
ont-rule-against-partisan-gerrymandering/.
186 Carter Hanson, “Holding Elections During a Pandemic is Undemocratic,” Medium, April 7, 2020,
https://medium.com/@chanson7908/holding-elections-during-a-pandemic-is-undemocratic-9666942df472.
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Part II: The Province and Duty of the Judicial Department
Both the majority opinion and Justice Kagan’s dissent (which was joined by justices Breyer,
Ginsberg, and Sotomayor) in Rucho v. Common Cause built their arguments from the same
passage, written by Chief Justice John Marshall, from Marbury v. Madison, the 1803 Supreme
Court case that established the role of the judiciary in overseeing the constitutionality of the law:
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”188
From this foundation, the majority in Rucho, led by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by justices
Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Thomas, argued that sometimes—as they believed was the case
in Rucho—it is the duty of the judiciary to say what is outside of their jurisdiction—to leave the
election process to the legislative branch without oversight. The majority, however, recognized189
the presence of extreme partisan gerrymanders in Maryland and North Carolina, as well as
conceded their near-constitutional or constitutional dimensions, writing: “The districting plans at
issue here are highly partisan by any measure.” One wonders whether if the measure of190
gerrymandering is, therefore, at issue for the majority to the extent that they will claim it to
be—but I digress.
Despite this recognition, the majority was not compelled by the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment, First Amendment, or Elections Clause arguments. The first issue raised by the
majority related to the statistical outlier analysis method itself, rather than any of the plaintiffs
constitutionality arguments: the majority claimed that statistical outlier analysis, like partisan
bias and the efficiency gap, relied on a baseline of proportional representation to measure itself
against, or at least implied such a baseline. The majority argued that statistical outlier analysis,
because it sorts maps along a curve according to partisan outcome, did not improve on prior
gerrymandering measures, and, therefore, “partisan gerrymandering claims invariably sound in
a desire for proportional representation.” Furthermore, because proportionality is not a191
constitutional requirement for the drawing of district lines, the majority ruled that partisan
gerrymanders are nonjusticiable, overturning the precedent of Davis v. Bandemer.
The objection that statistical outlier analysis uses proportionality as a baseline reflects an acute
misunderstanding—whether intentional or not—of the functions of the method in measuring
partisan gerrymanders on the part of the Court’s conservative majority. As I said last chapter,
“Fundamentally, statistical outlier analysis is descriptive of maps relative to the most probable,
191 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 16 (2019) (Roberts, J.).
190 Charles Fried, “A Day of Sorrow for American Democracy,” The Atlantic, July 3, 2019,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/rucho-v-common-cause-occasion-sorrow/593227/.
189 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 34 (2019) (Roberts, J.).
188 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
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nonpartisan map rather than it being prescriptive of maps being gerrymanders.” In partisan
gerrymandering litigation, the variable under scrutiny in the redistricting process is, perhaps
unsurprisingly, partisan intent. Statistical outlier analysis is a method to mathematically prove the
presence of partisan intent in maps, by comparing a map that has had a suit brought against it to
the random average of maps for that state accounting for state and federal criteria.
In Rucho oral arguments, advocate for the appellants (the anti-reform defendants) Paul D.
Clement stated that the plaintiffs were really arguing that the problem was “a lack of
proportional representation.” This assertion misses the mark, though it related more to the192
constitutionality of ruling on partisan gerrymandering than statistical outlier analysis. Justice
Sotomayor responded: “...all of the tests that they’re (the plaintiffs) proposing and that the
district court looked at didn’t talk about proportional representation. It looked at only the
opportunity to elect. An opportunity is different.” Sotomayor’s response has some problems193
from a judicial perspective: the opportunity to elect may imply a standard of competitiveness, as
voters in noncompetitive districts arguably do not have a substantial opportunity to
elect—although the same is certainly true of voters in gerrymandered districts as well.
Competitiveness as a standard remains a political, rather than a legal question.
Instead of an opportunity to elect, statistical outlier analysis is a tool to isolate partisan intent,
and this approach, in my opinion, is far more effective than opportunity to elect in determining
the constitutionality of maps. Justice Kagan was right in her dissent that statistical outlier
analysis “essentially answers the question: In a state with these geographic features and this
distribution of voters and this set of districting criteria—but without partisan
manipulation—what would happen?” The ensemble of reasonable maps generated through the194
statistical outlier method give courts a set of “comparators,” as Justice Kagan dubbed, which
provide both the means to identify partisan gerrymanders and the set of rigorous tests that
delineate the threshold of extremity required for judicial action. In other words, unlike the
majority’s fear, the method gives courts a procedure: maps are acceptable, regardless of their
partisan outcome, as long as they fall within a range and are not so extreme as to have been
crafted with predominant partisan intent. As Justice Kagan stated in Rucho oral arguments:195
“...the state can do whatever it wants, it can depart from proportional representation however
much it wants to, however much the natural features of the state would suggest, it can come up
with something that’s not proportional representation at all. What it can’t do is deviate from that
based on partisan considerations.”196
196 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (Kagan, J., oral arguments, 59:20).
195 Ibid, 22–23.
194 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 19 note 3 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
193 Ibid, Sotomayor, J., 6:36.
192 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (Clement, oral arguments, 6:27).
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In Rucho specifically, the North Carolina congressional map was so extreme an outlier that only
partisan intent could possibly have been the predominant objective in the redistricting process.
Statistical outlier analysis proves this not by enforcing a baseline of proportionality, but by
isolating the variable of partisan intent by generating an ensemble of other possible maps, all
following state and federal criteria, which were not drawn with the explicit goal of maximizing
the number of Republicans elected to Congress. Why do we know partisan intent was the
predominant factor in drawing the North Carolina congressional map? Because, as advocate for
Common Cause Emmet Bondurant said in oral argument, “You cannot possibly explain the 10/3
advantage based on political geography, democratic clustering, the application of independent
redistricting principles, or pure chance.” When maps are gerrymandered to the extent that the197
North Carolina congressional map was, the law should recognize that, as professor Charles Fried
wrote in The Atlantic, “enough is enough.”198
The second objection raised by the Rucho majority opinion is that they saw the threshold of
unconstitutionality as arbitrary. The threshold problem was brought up in Vieth v. Jubelirer, in199
Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality opinion, which described it as “the original unanswerable
question.” The majority argues that the plaintiffs—and Justice Kagan’s dissent—have no200
discernable standard or threshold, no procedure for future partisan gerrymandering litigation, but
the majority missed the point: statistical outlier analysis is descriptive, not prescriptive, and in
the case of the 2016 North Carolina congressional map, it describes a clear and extreme partisan
gerrymander. In Rucho, the 2016 congressional map was, according to Justice Kagan’s dissent,
“The absolute worst of 3,001 possible maps;” not only that, there is testimony (which I quoted
earlier) from prominent North Carolina Republicans declaring their partisan intent. Setting the201
evidence aside, the majority opinion itself recognized the partisan intent behind the drawing of
the map. “How much is too much?” wrote Justice Kagan. “This much is too much.”202
Partisan gerrymandering is an example of a recognized violation of individual voters’ rights,
which the majority of the Supreme Court apparently believes is not its responsibility—it is a set
of rights that the judiciary believes it cannot protect. This is not how justice should function in a
democracy. The majority believes they cannot say what the law is because it is too difficult to
find a threshold; the simple solution is to set a threshold—which is exactly what district courts
did in both Rucho and Lamone. Judicial tests are commonplace, and have already been utilized203
203 Ibid, 27.
202 Ibid.
201 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 26 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
200 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 296–297 (2004) (plurality opinion).
199 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 28 (2019) (Roberts, J.).
198 Fried, “A Day of Sorrow for American Democracy.”
197 Ibid, Bondurant, 34:41.
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in partisan gerrymandering litigation. The discussion of where the threshold should be is
important, but the North Carolina map under scrutiny in Rucho is so extreme a gerrymander that
any conceivable threshold would determine the map to be unconstitutional. As such, the Court
has vindicated the most extreme gerrymander in modern U.S. history because there is no set
threshold of unconstitutionality when, in fact, any threshold would find the map unconstitutional.
The absurdity of the majority’s threshold argument—that either there is a set threshold or all
gerrymanders are vindicated—is described in analogy by professor Fried in The Atlantic: “If one
cannot say how many hairs a man may have to still count as bald, there are no bald men.” If204
the role of the Supreme Court is to protect the constitutional rights of citizens, in Rucho they
failed, with terrible consequences for both the institution of American democracy and the
voices—and votes—of the American people.
The third objection in the majority opinion is something I like to call the judicial floodgates
argument. The majority first questions the constitutional—and constitutionally-intended—role of
the judiciary in overseeing elections, recalling the initial question of justiciability: “The question
here is whether there is an ‘appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary’ in remedying the problem
of partisan gerrymandering—whether such claims are claims of legal right, resolvable to legal
principles, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.” The majority does205
not believe the judiciary has a constitutional responsibility to oversee elections and prosecute
gerrymandering litigation, primarily drawing this reasoning from constitutional originalism (or
the intent of the founders).206
The majority then argues that, because there is no constitutionally-mandated role for the federal
judiciary in gerrymandering litigation, and because there is no set threshold or procedure for
unconstitutionality, if they were to rule in the plaintiffs’ favor, it would unleash a flood of
challenges to maps across the country. The majority opinion cites a passage from Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer which says: “The correction of all election district
lines drawn for partisan reasons would commit federal and state courts to unprecedented
intervention in the American political process.”207
The problem with this argument is that there is a clear procedure established by the plaintiffs in
Rucho. The district courts in both Rucho and Lamone used a judicial test comprised of three
parts: first, plaintiffs had to prove predominant partisan intent. Second, plaintiffs must prove208
that this intent translated into a tangible effect in the form of vote dilution. And third, defendants
208 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 16 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
207 Ibid, 15; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206 Ibid, 11.
205 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 7 (2019) (Roberts, J.).
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have the opportunity to attempt to prove that another motivation—other than partisan
intent—was predominant in the redistricting process. As advocate for Common Cause Emmet
Bondurant said in oral argument: “This is a standard that can be understood. That is a standard
that legislators will obey. And that is a standard that will reduce, not increase, litigation.”209
In fact, the opposite of what the majority argued is already happening: the Rucho ruling has
increased gerrymandering and election law litigation, causing its own judicial floodgates. This210
has come in the form of cases like Republican National Committee v. Democratic National
Committee in Wisconsin this year.211
The majority’s fourth argument is based on, as I have termed it, judicial laziness. Finding a
threshold and establishing a procedure is difficult so, as Justice Kagan wrote in her dissent, “The
whole thing is impossible, the majority concludes.” Except a threshold and a procedure, again,212
has already been establish by the district courts. In Rucho oral arguments, this judicial laziness213
surfaced in the form of Justice Gorsuch’s search for an alternative to judicial action. He brought
up Colorado, his—and my—home state, and our passage of a pair of ballot initiatives in 2018
that established independent redistricting commissions for legislative and congressional
redistricting, effectively ending gerrymandering in Colorado. He then calls into question the214
actual extent of gerrymandering and if it can be solved through more ballot initiatives.
Unfortunately, Colorado may be the exception, rather than the rule. Many states do not have a
ballot initiative process as effective or comprehensive as Colorado’s. In oral argument,
Bondurant said, “The vast majority of states east of the Mississippi, including specifically North
Carolina, do not have citizen initiative… You can only amend the constitution with the approval
of the legislature, in proposing an amendment that gets to the ballot and is then ratified. And that
is not an effective remedy. And the states in which you have independent redistricting
commissions are states in which those commissions were adopted over the dead bodies of the
legislators by citizen initiative, passed overwhelmingly by the citizens and in the face of
legislative opposition.”215
The greater issue with judicial laziness is that partisan gerrymandering litigation is, ultimately,
the responsibility of the courts—not the responsibility of a few ballot initiatives to gradually
215 Ibid, Bondurant, 43:28.
214 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (Gorsuch, J., oral arguments, 12:06).
213 Guy-Uriel E. Charles and Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, “SCOTUS's Ruling on Gerrymandering Endangers U.S.
Democracy,” Time, July 11, 2019, https://time.com/5623638/scotuss-ruling-on-gerrymandering-endangers
-us-democracy/.
212 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___, 22 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
211 Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. ____ (2020).
210 Charles and Fuentes-Rohwer, “What’s behind the fight over Wisconsin’s primary?”
209 Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (Bondurant, oral arguments, 52:45).
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claw back citizen power. The objections raised by Gorsuch—that someone else can fix the
problem for the judiciary—is a tactic that muddies the legal water and intentionally misses the
point. As advocate for League of Women Voters of North Carolina Allison Riggs said in oral
arguments, “Other options don’t relieve this Court of its duty to vindicate constitutional rights.”
216
216 Ibid, Riggs, 1:06:53.
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Part III: Sovereign no Longer
More than anything, it is the legal philosophy of the majority in Rucho v. Common Cause that
disturbs me. The United States deifies its founders like no other democracy; Washington,
Jefferson, Adams, and Madison loom over American history like Alexander the Great to the
Romans and the Ptolemies—we seem to be forever in their shadow.
The title of this project is taken from a line of the Declaration of Independence that reflects the
sentiment that compelled the establishment and still compels the perfection of our union: “We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed…”
No constitution, being born of imperfect compromise between imperfect men, is completely
exceptional; nor is any nation, being the flawed reflection and manifestation of people, who, in
their infinite nuances and complexities, are neither good nor bad—they are simply human.
The Founders understood this; they understood that posterity would never forgive them for many
un—and ill—resolved problems, and they knew they could not construct a nation that was above
perfection. Nor did they seek to create that perfect union; their true aim was to enable the
benevolent influence of time in a free republic. Their objective was to give posterity the benefit
of hindsight; progress, that liberating evolution, was their true aim, as it is only enabled by the
maintenance of democratic government and the ready participation of its citizens in its exercise.
Gerrymandering is a crisis of democracy, hindering political evolution and realization by
removing the voice of the citizen in their just representation and giving that power to a handful
of partisan cartographers. What the founders intended for the redistricting process is ultimately
beside the point: the truest respect given to the founders is progress, and no issue calls for
substantial reform and action like partisan gerrymandering.
The definition and purpose of democracy is in elections and, more than that, meaningful
elections. Timothy Snyder wrote in his book The Road to Unfreedom: “Democracies die when217
people cease to believe that voting matters. The question is not whether elections are held, but
whether they are free and fair. If so, democracy produces a sense of time, an expectation of the
future that calms the present. The meaning of each democratic election is promise of the next
one… In this way, democracy transforms human fallibility into political predictability, and helps
217 Carter Hanson, “Truth Against the Total State,” The Pensive Anchor, March 27, 2020, audio,
https://pensiveanchor.podbean.com/e/season-2-episode-2-truth-against-the-total-state/.
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us to experience time as movement forward into a future over which we have some influence. If
we come to believe that elections are simply a repetitive ritual of support, democracy loses its
meaning.”218
Gerrymandering denies American citizens their most essential right: to participate in meaningful,
free, and fair elections. It is the emphatic duty of the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court to
say that the law is against gerrymandering, and to protect this right as the fundamental pillar of
our democratic society.
218 Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018), 249.
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5. The Value of Democracy
Independent Redistricting Commissions as a Solution for Partisan
Gerrymandering
Part 1: The Nuclear Option
On November 1, 2011, the Arizona State Senate voted 21–6 along party lines to remove Colleen
Coyle Mathis from the state’s independent redistricting commission. Mathis had been the219
chairwoman and the sole independent member of the five-member committee appointed to
redraw the state’s congressional and legislative district maps following the 2010 Census. The220
impeachment of Chairwoman Mathis, prior to it’s initiation, had been known as “the nuclear
option” in the long-running battle between the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
and the Republican-controlled state government, and talk of impeachment had generally been
dismissed by Democrats as “saber rattling.” Only a month before the State Senate voted to221
impeach Mathis, then-Governor Jan Brewer, also a Republican, had called the congressional map
produced by the commission “simply gerrymandering at its worst.”222
The vote in the state Senate followed Governor Brewer’s initiation of the impeachment process
on October 26, 2011, when she sent a letter of grievances to Chairwoman Mathis. In the letter,
Governor Brewer accused Chairwoman Mathis of committing “substantial neglect of duty and
gross misconduct in office while serving on the Independent Redistricting Commission.” Her
justification to impeach was based on the criteria that Mathis had used in the new congressional
maps proposed by the Independent Redistricting Commission (also known as the IRC). Brewer
criticized Mathis’s prioritization of competitiveness in the commission’s redistricting of the
Arizona congressional map. Additionally, Brewer asserted that the IRC had “violated
constitutional requirements” by engaging in gerrymandering practices such as breaking up
communities of interest without regard for compactness and contiguity, as well as making the
creation of three districts along the southern border a redistricting goal. The impeachment
222 Ibid.
221 Abby Livingston, “Arizona Governor Starts Impeachment Process Against Redistricting Panel,” Roll Call,
October 26, 2011, https://www.rollcall.com/2011/10/26/arizona-governor-starts-impeachment-process
-against-redistricting-panel/.
220 Siddhartha Mahanta, “Jan Brewer Goes Nuclear on the Arizona Redistricting Commission,” Mother Jones,
October 27, 2011, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/10/jan-brewer-goes-nuclear-
redistricting-commission/.
219 Alex Isenstadt, “Arizona redistricting chief impeached,” Politico, November 1, 2011,
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ostensibly targeted all five commissioners, though the removal of Chairwoman Mathis was the
Republican-controlled state government’s primary objective.223
The impeachment was immediately condemned by Arizona Democrats. According to an article
from Roll Call published October 26, 2011: “Arizona Democratic Party Executive Director Luis
Heredia described the governor as ‘drunk with power,’ calling the move ‘a brazen power grab
that would rival any in Arizona history.’” Additionally, according to a Politico article from224
November 1: “Andrei Cherny, chairman of the Arizona Democratic Party, called the
impeachment vote ‘a historic abuse of power without parallel in modern American history.’”225
Despite Democrats’ objections, the impeachment went through without difficulty, and Colleen
Mathis was removed from her position as chairwoman of the IRC on November 1, 2011.




Part II: Keeping Politics Out of It
The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission began in 2001, after a ballot initiative,
Proposition 106 (also known as “Fair Districts, Fair Elections”), passed with 56% of the
statewide vote a year earlier, in 2000. Proposition 106 was put on the ballot by a group of226
voters across party lines, including Republicans, Democrats, and unaffiliated voters. It227
amended the state constitution and shifted power over the redistricting process from the state
legislature and the governor to a five-member citizen commission, which was comprised of two
Democrats, two Republicans, and one independent. This partisan composition roughly228
matched the state electorate, which had a roughly even split of registered Republicans,
Democrats, and unaffiliated voters.229
Colleen Coyle Mathis, who was eventually impeached from the IRC in November 2011, first
became involved in the commission in 2010, when she stumbled across a pamphlet published by
the IRC that called for applications for the independent seat on the commission. She applied230
and was selected to become the sole independent on the commission, also making her the
chairperson and the crucial deciding vote.
Almost immediately after taking office, Chairwoman Mathis came under attack from both
Republican voters and politicians. The battle over the Arizona IRC came at the tail end of the
Tea Party Movement, which was a conservative grassroots movement begun in 2009 that was a
reaction to the election of President Barack Obama, his handling of the Great Recession, and the
passage of the Affordable Care Act. When Mathis voted often with the two Democratic231
members of the commission, many Tea Party activists and other Republicans accused Mathis of
being a secret Democrat, sabotaging the nonpartisan mission of the IRC.
231 Chris Good, “On Social Issues, Tea Partiers Are Not Libertarians,” The Atlantic, October 6, 2010,
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tumultuous-life-of-an-independent-redistricting-commissioner.
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At the same time as conservative-leaning voters were becoming increasingly suspicious of—and
angry at—Mathis, the IRC attempted to become more transparent and responsive to public input.
Mathis described this outreach effort in a paper she co-authored with Daniel Moskowitz and
Benjamin Schneer and was published by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government in
September 2019: “Before a single line was drawn, the commission embarked on a ‘listening
tour,’ where commissioners traveled the state to host 23 public hearings exclusively held to
obtain input on what the redistricting criteria set forth in the state constitution meant to Arizona
citizens. Then, during the line-drawing phase, the commission provided time for public comment
at all of its business meetings... Finally, once the commission completed drawing draft maps, the
commissioners again traveled around the state to 30 towns and cities to gather feedback on their
work. Ultimately, the commission received more than 7,400 items of public input along with 224
maps suggested by the public...” The feedback from the public informed the final drawing of232
the lines and directed the commission throughout the entire redistricting process.
However, many of the public hearings did not go as expected. Tea Party activists descended on
them and attacked Mathis for her perceived Democratic bias. According to an article published
by the Associated Press in November 2019, “At a public meeting of the panel at Pima
Community College on a scorching hot June afternoon in 2011, one person after another berated
Mathis. The speakers were angry about what they thought were Democratic-leaning decisions,
including the hiring of a mapping consultant with ties to President Barack Obama’s first
presidential campaign.”233
Here’s one Arizonan who attended the public hearing at Pima Community College in June 2011:
“So slanted have your votes been against Republicans, that there is no question what the goal of
this commission is. But what can we expect when the independent is not really an independent?
She’s married to an activist Democrat.”234
Here’s another activist: “You know, I thought this commission was supposed to be non-partisan.
Damn it, you can’t get any more partisan than this!”235
The Republican outrage directed at the IRC in June 2011 was fueled by the commission’s hiring
of a mapping consultant firm that had worked for Democrats in the past. Additionally,
Republicans were concerned with Mathis’s husband, Christopher Mathis, who was a life-long
Republican but had recently been working for a Democratic candidate for a state legislative seat.
235 Ibid, 2:43–2:53.
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Colleen Mathis dismissed the Republican insinuation that her husband’s politics determined236
her actions as a part of the commission. From the Associated Press: “She found it insulting and
sexist that critics couldn’t separate her husband’s work from hers. She made her decisions based
on what she felt was right, she said, and what was required of her by law, including provisions
that emphasized competitive districts that put the commission at odds with Republicans in
power.”237
At this point in the map-drawing process, Mathis also received criticism from the two
Republican members of the IRC. In an interview in 2019, Scott Day Freeman, one of those
Republicans, said the congressional and legislative maps, as well as (what he perceived to be) a
lack of transparency in the redrawing, were “constitutionally suspect.”238
Chairwoman Mathis began to receive death threats. According to the Arizona Republic, after
lawsuits were filed against the IRC, “The panel’s office was also broken into and their computers
stolen (no suspects were ever arrested in that incident).” Colleen and Christopher Mathis put239
plywood boards on their windows and installed floor bolts on their door to secure themselves
against any violence directed at them by far-right extremists. When asked about the plywood240
boards on the FiveThirtyEight Politics Podcast, Colleen Mathis said, “We just felt kind of like it
would be nice to be able to sleep at night and not worry that somebody was looking in the
window or going to do anything.” Sometimes, Mathis stayed at friends’ and neighbors’ houses241
when her own home became too dangerous. Around this time, Mathis also met with FBI agents
to discuss threats to her life.
That July, Republican state Senator Frank Atenori said of the ongoing legal battle between the
Republican-controlled state government and the IRC, “The gun is loaded and it’s just figuring
out what target to point it at and when to pull the trigger.”242
This comment was particularly distasteful at the time, given the fact that U.S. Representative
Gabby Giffords had been shot in the head at a constituent event in a grocery store parking lot in
Tucson only six months earlier. Giffords survived the shooting, but six others, including a243
243 Marc Lacey and David M. Herszenhorn, “In Attack’s Wake, Political Repercussions,” New York Times, January 8,
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federal district court chief judge and a nine-year-old girl, did not. Senator Atenori later said that
he was using “military analogies” that were not meant to be a threat.244
Needless to say, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission did not exactly succeed in
removing politics from the redistricting process. The simple truth is that the drawing of district
lines is going to be political, no matter who does the drawing. Said Chairwoman Mathis, “You
just can’t take politics out of it.”245
In redistricting, the composition of Congress and state legislatures is at stake, meaning that both
Democratic and Republican politicians are invested in the partisan composition of maps
produced by redistricting commissions—including independent commissions. Justin Levitt,
associate dean of Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, California, said that the Arizona IRC was
controversial “because political leaders in the state have tried to make it very controversial.”246
Furthermore, said Levitt, “She (Mathis) was the chair of the commission that the prevailing
party didn’t appreciate. The commission put their heads down and did the job citizens told them
to do.”247
The IRC eventually produced a redrawn congressional map for the state, which further upset
Republicans. The partisan composition of the map was four solid Republican districts, two solid
Democratic districts, and three tossup seats.248
Keep in mind, Arizona leans Republican, but only slightly: in the 2016 presidential election,
Donald Trump won the state by only 3.5%, receiving 48.1% of statewide votes compared to
Hillary Clinton’s 44.6%. More recently, however, Arizona has shifted slightly to the left: in the249
2018 race for Arizona's open Senate seat (following the death of Senator John McCain),
Democrat Kyrsten Sinema defeated Republican Martha McSally by 2.4%, with Sinema receiving
50% of votes and McSally receiving 47.6%. Additionally, as of August 28, 2020, Joe Biden250
has a 4.3% lead in the polls in Arizona over Donald Trump.251
Given that context, the map drawn by the IRC and Chairwoman Mathis in 2011 was fairly
egalitarian, favoring neither party substantially more than the other. Republicans need to win
only in one of the three swing districts in order to have a majority of the state’s Congressional
251 “Who’s ahead in Arizona?” FiveThirtyEight, December 4, 2020,
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seats, while Democrats need to win all three tossup districts. This reflects Arizona’s slight
Republican tilt while maximizing the number of swing districts, which produce representatives
that are more responsive to the demands of constituents than those from solid blue or red
districts. Since the new Arizona Congressional map was drawn in 2011, Republicans have held a
majority of the congressional delegation twice—following the 2014 and 2016252 253
elections—and Democrats twice—following the 2012 and 2018 elections. This roughly254 255
matches the partisan voting shifts in Arizona in the past decade.
Mathis’s IRC was unique in its prioritization of drawing competitive districts. In fact, as Galen
Druke, host of the FiveThirtyEight podcast The Gerrymandering Project, said, “Arizona is the
only state in the country that requires officials to draw competitive districts when making
political maps.” The practice of valuing competitiveness as much as other redistricting criteria256
such as compactness and minority representation began, to some extent, with Chairwoman
Mathis. Said Mathis: “Some of the most competitive races in the country are in Arizona now, and
I attribute that directly to the commission’s work.”257
Mathis’s drive to produce competitive districts came from her interpretation of the Arizona
Constitution’s mandate for the IRC. In the state Constitution, six criteria are established for the
drawing of congressional and legislative district lines: (1) redistricting must comply with the
U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, (2) districts must have roughly equal populations,
(3) districts are to be relatively compact and must be contiguous, (4) communities of interest
must be maintained, (5) redistricting must be informed by the state’s physical and human
geography, and (6) competitive districts must be drawn when possible. This sixth criterion,258
described in Article 4, Part 2, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution, reads “To the extent
practicable, competitive districts should be favored where to do so would create no significant
detriment to the other goals.” Until Mathis took office, this sixth criterion was largely ignored259
in the redistricting process. Her map achieves this mandate, creating three competitive districts,
while also succeeding in the other five criteria: it complies with the Constitution and the Voting
Rights Act; it maintains population equality across districts; all districts are contiguous, and it
scores decidedly middle-of-the-road in terms of compactness, scoring as less compact than260
260 “Redrawing the Map on Redistricting 2012,” Azavea, accessed December 4, 2020, https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.
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states like New York but more compact than states like Missouri, using a common compactness
measured called the Polsby-Popper Index; it maintains communities of interest; and it is drawn in
accordance with state geography.
In truth, Mathis’s and the IRC’s maps were manifestly reasonable. So, too, was Mathis’s
cartographic philosophy: the Arizona Constitution clearly delineates competitiveness at the same
level as other redistricting criteria.
Hanson 67
Part III: The Legislature vs. the People
Two weeks after the Arizona State Senate voted along party lines to remove Mathis from her
position as chairwoman of the IRC, Mathis went to the Arizona Supreme Court to argue that
there was no sufficient justification for her removal. She was represented by former Arizona261
Chief Justice Thomas Zlaket who said before the court that if Mathis lost her case, the IRC
“becomes a joke, a laughable joke subject to manipulation by the very people that the
commission was designed to insulate from.” Following the two-hour proceedings, the court262
unanimously overturned the impeachment.263
Republicans, dissatisfied with the ruling, took Mathis to federal court, and the suit eventually
landed in the U.S. Supreme Court in 2015. The case, Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission, revolved around Article 1, Section 4 of the U.S.264
Constitution, which states, “[t]he times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof.”
The appellants, the Republican-controlled state legislature, argued that, as Paul Clement, who
represented the legislature before the Supreme Court, said in oral arguments, “when the Framers
used the word ‘legislature’ they meant the word ‘legislature.’” Side note: I mentioned Paul265
Clement last chapter, as he also represented the appellants in Rucho v. Common Cause.
In other words, the appellants argued that when the Founders wrote the word “legislature,” they
intended for state legislatures to have sole control over the redistricting process. A ballot
initiative creating an independent redistricting commission that was not supervised or directed by
the legislature, and that was created without the legislature’s approval, is, therefore,
unconstitutional. The consequences of a Supreme Court ruling in favor of the appellants cannot
be understated. Arizona is—both today and back in 2015—not the only state with an
independent redistricting commission—far from it. A ruling in favor of the appellants would
most likely put a halt to independent redistricting commissions, at the time affecting the drawing
of 152 districts (or about a third of Congress).266
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265 Totenberg, “Supreme Court To Weigh Power Of Redistricting Commissions.”
264 Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. 787 (2015).
263 Totenberg, “Supreme Court To Weigh Power Of Redistricting Commissions.”
262 Vasilogambros, “The Tumultuous Life of an Independent Redistricting Commissioner.”
261 Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission v. Brewer, 229 Ariz. 347 (2012).
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In oral arguments, advocate for the appellants Paul Clement narrowed his definition of
“legislature” as used in the Constitution, to mean, as he said, state legislatures, and that the
drawing of congressional and legislative maps should be completely within the discretion of state
representatives and state senators.
In contrast, the plaintiffs, represented by Seth Waxman, argued that such a narrow definition of
“legislature” was, in actuality, counter to the intention of the Constitution and its Framers. In267
oral arguments, Waxman said that when the Framers established the Constitution, “it was
understood that ‘legislature’ meant the body that makes the law.” The plaintiffs used Article 4,268
Part 1, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution to support the claim that this “body” that comprises
the legislature includes the people in its definition: “The legislative authority of the state shall be
vested in the legislature, consisting of a senate and a house of representatives, but the people
reserve the power to propose laws and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject
such laws and amendments at the polls, independently of the legislature.” Thus, the people of269
Arizona do have the power to pass ballot initiatives that amend the state constitution and change
the role of the state legislature in the redistricting process.
Clement counterred that the plaintiffs draw a false equivalent between the people and the
legislature. The Constitution recognizes that they are clearly separate entities, and delegates the
drawing of district lines solely to the legislature—not to the people. Waxman responded270
simply and effectively: “The gravamen of [the legislature’s] suit is that the people ‘usurped’ the
power of a legislative body that they themselves created.” Waxman is right, American271
democracy is founded on the essential concept that the people ultimately hold the power and
form governments to provide them with security and sustenance, thus establishing society. The
people created the legislatures, and, therefore, they have the right to amend its powers.
The Supreme Court ruled 5–4 in favor of the plaintiffs in a victory for the Independent
Redistricting Commission. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion and was
joined by justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Sotomayor. On the flip side of the ruling, justices Alito,
Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas dissented.
271 Ibid.
270 Epps, “Government of the Legislature.”
269 Arizona Constitution, Article 4, Part 1, Section 1
268 Ibid.




Ginsburg’s opinion affirms the right of state’s to have referenda and ballot initiative processes
that amend state constitutions, even if changes relate to federal elections: “It is characteristic272
of our federal system, that states retain authority to establish their own governmental processes
and to serve as laboratories for experiment in democratic governance. We resist reading the
Election Clause to single out federal elections as the one area in which states may not use citizen
initiatives as an alternative legislative process. The framers may not have imagined the modern
initiative process one in which the people of a state exercise legislative authority on an equal
footing with the authority of an institutional legislature but the invention of the initiative was in
full harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of government power.”
273
A year later, the maps produced by Mathis and the Arizona IRC were affirmed unanimously by
the Supreme Court based on the precedent of Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission.
The success of reformers in this pair of cases essentially means that, as Wendy Weiser, director
of the Democracy Program at the Brennan Center for Justice, said, “The Constitution is not a
barrier to states who want to address the problem of partisan gerrymandering.”274
.  .  .
The importance of the Arizona IRC case is twofold: first, it affirmed the right of the people to
form completely nonpolitical and independent redistrict commissions by ballot initiative; and
second, it allowed for the prioritization of creating competitive races in congressional and
legislative redistricting.
Last chapter, I discussed Rucho v. Common Cause, the 2018 Supreme Court case that essentially
shut the door on judicial resolutions to partisan gerrymandering.  While the Supreme Court
shunned its constitutional duty to protect the right of citizens to participate in meaningful
elections, Rucho did not affect or alter the role that independent redistricting commissions play in
many states. As a result of Rucho, IRCs are now one of the best means to combat partisan
gerrymandering in the United States. In her 2019 Harvard Kennedy School of Government
274 Bill Chappell, “Supreme Court Backs Arizona's Redistricting Commission Targeting Gridlock,” NPR, June 29,
2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/29/418521823/supreme-court-backs-arizonas-redistricting
-commission-targeting-gridlock.
273 “Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,” opinion announcements, Oyez,
accessed December 4, 2020, audio, 7:12, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-1314.
272 Thomas E. Mann, “Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al,”
Brookings, June 29, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/06/29/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-
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paper, Colleen Mathis wrote, “[...] after the Rucho decision, independent redistricting
commissions represent perhaps the most viable means to combat partisan gerrymandering.”275
The ruling opened the door for independent redistricting commissions to be established across
the country through ballot initiatives. Since the Arizona State Legislature ruling, four
states—Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, and Utah—have amended their constitutions to remove
redistricting power from state legislatures and give that power to nonpartisan, independent
commissions. In three of those four states, initiatives passed with more than 60% support; in276
the fourth state, Utah, the initiative barely passed, with only 50.3% support. Those states are
joined by Ohio, whose constitution was amended by an initiative that was allowed on the ballot
by the state legislature, after a tougher initiative was expected to pass. Those five states—Ohio,
Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, and Utah—have a total of 49 representatives, which means that in
the last four years, about 11.3% of the U.S. House has been un-gerrymandered through ballot
initiatives.
Despite the recent successes in redistricting reform through the institution of independent
redistricting commissions, this approach to reform is limited by the fact that only twenty-six
states allow for ballot initiative processes. In states like Pennsylvania, the only way the state277
constitution can be amended is through the state legislature, which is nearly impossible because
the very problem that requires amending the state constitution for its resolution (partisan
gerrymandering) is the same problem that keeps the majority of the state legislature comfortably
in power. In many cases, asking the legislature to eliminate gerrymandering is, essentially, asking
them to forfeit their majority and, often, their seat in the legislature. Gerrymandering is a truly
nonpartisan institution, meaning that the majority party, regardless of its ideology, nearly always
tries to protect it. It is the quintessence of the refrain that power acts upon the powerful: it
transforms the majority party into the gerrymandering party. Therefore, if there is to be a
resolution to partisan gerrymandering, it must exist outside of the world of partisan politics. In
lieu of a Supreme Court ruling, the solution is in either ballot initiatives and the establishment of
IRCs or gerrymandering suits brought before state supreme courts using state constitutions,
rather than the U.S. Constitution, as legal foundation.
277 Ibid.
276 Michael Wines, “Drive Against Gerrymandering Finds New Life in Ballot Initiatives,” New York Times, July 23,
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/us/gerrymandering-states.html.
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